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East Europe Report

POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS

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NEED FOR INCREASED WORK DISCIPLINE STRESSED

Tirana ZERI I POPULLIT in Albanian 4 Apr 84 p 1

[Article: "Need for Productive Cooperation to Implement Work Disciplines and Regulations"]

[Text] One of the most important goals of the trade unions is to educate workers to respect the law, rules and regulations. The new guidelines which were given to the trade unions, in accordance with a party directive, to solve disagreements at work have prevented some of these problems and have helped to solve those that have occurred outside the courts. The fact that over 40 percent of these problems were solved in this manner since the guidelines were implemented shows the correctness of having given these guidelines to the trade unions. This new measure has increased the role of the trade union organizations as well as that of the working class as the leading class in the country.

However, in spite of the considerable improvements that have taken place, the basic party organizations and bureaus must further expand their guiding role to reduce the number of disagreements at work and to create more harmonious cooperation between the trade union committees and the enterprise administrations. In some branches of the economy and in some districts this number is still too large. Thus, for example, problems of violation of work discipline are more prevalent in the petroleum, chemical, metallurgical and mining sectors. Whereas, problems of damage and misuse of the property are more prevalent in certain trade enterprises, especially in Shkoder, Durres, Fier, and other districts.

It is necessary that the trade union committees analyze these problems at work better than they have done so far, because we often see that they make erroneous judgements. Thus, we see instances when liberal positions have been supported and tendencies to soften the rules, without reason, for the benefit of the workers, have led to the making of decisions which are against the law. As a result, 50 percent of the trade union committee decisions dealing with material responsibilities were baseless and were overruled by the district courts. In Vlore District, for example, 90 decisions, valued at 275,000 leks, which the union committees had judged as beneficial to the workers were disallowed by the courts. At times, because of sick familiarity, the trade union committee meetings which investigate the workers' complaints take place without the prior knowledge of the enterprise managers.

This proves that a correct understanding of administrative procedures is lacking, and it is not understood that these attitudes have nothing to do with protecting the interests of the classes.

There are also instances when trade union committees do not make the effort to solve the problems themselves, but send the workers away telling them that "there is nothing we can do, see the legal authorities." Just as harmful are occasions when trade union committees support the management position in conflicts, without considering that the management position is not based on law, as happened in the case of some workers in Shkoder, Sarande, Permet and other places who were laid-off because they had missed school or missed work for a day without providing a reasonable excuse. These opportunistic attitudes are only maintained "not to lower the authority of the management" and to "maintain good relations with the enterprise administrations." This kind of behavior not only worries the workers, but also lowers the authority of the trade union committees who act as if they were "extensions" of the enterprise administration.

In addition, we must make sure that the enterprise administrators consider carefully the recommendations of the trade union committees when they recommend that problems not be taken to court. In Vlore District the court supported 115 of the trade union committee decisions which allowed workers to return to work because they had been laid-off unreasonably. As a result, the enterprises were forced to pay the workers 15,200 lek in back-pay for being laid-off without due cause.

We must fight bitterly against such opportunistic and sectarian attitudes. These attitudes are harmful, reckless and create arbitrary measures against the workers, and, at the same time, tolerate those who intentionally disregard regulations and harm and misuse the common wealth. The trade union organizations must not only stand firm against these instigators, but the basic party organizations also must discuss these matters and search for the cause of the problems.

Without denying the increasing attention that is being given to solving these problems correctly, the principal task of the trade unions still remains the development of more skilled educational work with the workers, to familiarize them with the party line and the laws of the state, and to demonstrate the ability of the trade union committees to implement the regulations. In many instances the trade unions are restricted in their work by certain laws, which are very often not even linked to the enterprises where conflicts at work have occurred. The state and legal organs must take a critical look at their own activities, because there have been instances of formality and self-complaisance. These organs are often satisfied merely with the number of conversations they have held to discuss laws and regulations. Jurists in the enterprises are not heard as they should be, and many of them simply become workers in the material and technical supply sectors.

It is necessary to increase cooperation between the trade union committees and the enterprise administrators to prevent disagreements at work, and to solve these problems when they occur. Bureaucratic and technocratic expressions which become obstacles to finding correct solutions to problems disregard the fact that they are a burden on the worker and the state treasury, and are both harmful.

STATEMENT BY BTA DIRECTOR ON ANTONOV CASE

Sofia LITERATUREN FRONT in Bulgarian 26 Apr, 3 May 84

[Article by Boyan Traykov, BTA chief director: "Conspiracy of New Crusaders"]

[26 Apr 84 pp 1, 6, 7]

[Text] A year and a half have passed since the "Antonov case" broke and the smear about a "Bulgarian trail" leading to the assassination attempt on Pope John Paul II was bruited about. A time during which the conspirators, though discredited and exposed, persisted and kept up an anti-Bulgarian campaign. But also a time during which world public opinion more and more clearly saw the truth and became aware of the monstrous nature of this great act of ideological sabotage against socialism by imperialism.

With the idea of giving a fuller notion of one of the greatest smears in history--its more significant facts, organization, aims, purposes, conclusions, realities and truth, I am answering a great number of questions put to me by the editors of the newspaper LITERATUREN FRONT, summarizing them chronologically and according to the logic of events.

A Second Wave of the Campaign Emerging?

The dialogue began with a book sensationally advertised in the West, "Vremeto na Ubiytsite" [Time of Assassins] by Claire Sterling. It claims to shed light on the "Antonov case" and to show our country in a terrorist image.

Sterling creates an illusion. Her book is reminiscent of the popular illusionist trick: a woman in a trunk which is ripped up with a saw. Children tremble while adults laugh.

Sterling counts on her readers not only not knowing, but having given no thought at all to what actually happens inside the "trunk with the woman" or, to be more precise, inside the "trunk with the attempted assassination."

Some journalists in the West have made excessive use of superlative expressions like "thoroughgoing research," "serious documentary nature" or "firmly established proofs" for this book. The question for their conscience is why they write this way. But in this book there is neither research nor documents and it has no proofs whatsoever. With nothing concrete or specific, Sterling juggles citations of anonymous sources who "think that. . ." or "are convinced that. . ." and hints at accusations with the expression, "It must be assumed."

For all that, Sterling's book, accompanied by Paul Henze's book as well, impressed me by the coincidence which I do not believe is accidental. Claire Sterling and Paul Henze are the same people who in August-September 1982 published long articles charging our country with the assassination attempt on the pope and stirring up public opinion in order to lay the groundwork for the big anti-Bulgarian campaign that followed. Now that the investigation-cum-provocation has collapsed and the campaign is spent, Claire Sterling and Paul Henze have now again published books and once more are whipping up public interest. Should we not expect a renewal, something like a second phase of the provocation, a second wave of the campaign?! Moreover, is it accidental again that Sterling is the first to announce that Sergey Antonov will be prosecuted?

Why the Political Provocation?

To show what is taking place in the "trunk of the assassination attempt," let me begin at the very start, at the time when Sergey Antonov was arrested in Rome.

The Bulgarian Telegraphic Agency is usually the first in our country to receive reports of world events. It happened that way too on that ill-fated day, 25 November 1982. A report came in from the Italian agency ANSA that a Bulgarian citizen, Sergey Ivanov Antonov, had been arrested in Rome for complicity in the assassination attempt on the head of the Roman Catholic Church. The news was met with surprise and bewilderment by all authorities.

Anybody might have said, "What a surprise," when as far back as 7 September, 79 days before Antonov's arrest, a BTA commentary had said, "The version of Ali Agca's 'testimony' does not stand up under any kind of logic, either--it changes so often and is so contradictory we would not be surprised if one fine day 'at somebody's suggestion' and in return for an appropriate promise, he even 'confesses' that the Bulgarians assigned him the mission of murdering the pope. . ."

When this commentary was written in answer to Claire Sterling's article, "The Plot to Murder the Pope," in READER'S DIGEST Magazine, we meant to say how preposterous and absurd its insinuations were. We couched this sentence precisely as an absurdity, as a joke. At that time it could not have occurred to us that this article of Sterling's was a harbinger of a great smear campaign against us and that this absurdity would prove to be a genuinely organized political conspiracy against socialist Bulgaria.

The surprise in Bulgaria on 25 November was great and nationwide. It was the surprise of a clear conscience. If our conscience had been guilty and if

Sergey Antonov had had anything to do with the assassination attempt, he would have departed by the first plane after Agca's arrest. He would at least have left Italy in a year's time when the article in READER'S DIGEST appeared. But Antonov stayed in Rome even when a check was made of the "Balkan" agency by the Italian police a few days before his arrest. Even alone, this absolutely simple fact shows and proves our clear conscience.

Sergey Antonov's arrest by the Italian police, and that on the exceptionally serious charge of being an accomplice in the assassination attempt on the Vatican chief of state, was characterized by the BTA in its announcement as an intolerable and crude political provocation. We based this on three facts:

--The Marxist-Leninist policy of our party and state absolutely rules out terrorism and most severely condemns terrorist acts not only in domestic political life but also in international relations. Moreover, Bulgarian organizations and agencies have always assisted and made a very valuable contribution to the campaign against international terrorism.

--Despite this a close check was made and it was ascertained that there is no organization or person in Bulgaria that gave or could have given an order to Sergey Antonov or to anybody else to organize or to participate in an assassination attempt on Pope John Paul II.

--After speedy inquiries it became clear that none of the Bulgarians who worked or associated with Antonov in Rome had observed him meeting with Ali Agca (already well known from the newspapers) or with other unknown or suspicious people. Nobody knew or supposed that Antonov had violated Italian laws in any way.

Since there was and could have been no Bulgarian connection whatsoever with the assassination attempt on the pope and since no offenses of Sergey Antonov are known or supposed, only one thing remains for us to think: the Italian police committed an absolutely arbitrary and illegal, in no way justified hostile act against a Bulgarian citizen in order to stir up political provocation of the Bulgarian People's Republic. And that not a fortuitous or accidental, but obviously a political provocation thought out and organized in advance, designed to incite and fuel the smear campaign, unprecedented in its intensity and scale, that they had started against Bulgaria and socialism in general. This campaign, which spread at once, likewise had an organized character. It began simultaneously in all quarters of the Western world and had the same target and the same ring, completely in the spirit of the global policy of imperialism and its strategic line against real socialism, against the policy of detente and cooperation, against the efforts for the preservation of peace which Bulgaria and the socialist community are making. A campaign in the spirit, to be brief and precise, of the crusade against communism declared by the American President Reagan.

Campaign--Organized, Set in Motion, Guided

Why do I assert that there was an advance plan and organization not only of the provocation but also of the subsequent anti-Bulgarian campaign?

Let me take up individually and in sequence the provocation in Rome, by which I mean the generation of the "Antonov case," and the ideological campaign against socialism alone for greater clarity. But they constitute one whole, the organically common and interdependent fruit of one idea and one scenario.

The provocation with Antonov's arrest, to be sure, was organized in advance. To issue an arrest warrant the Rome investigative division had to have some justification, at least so-called evidence. It was precisely the creation of evidence that had to be prepared in advance and, as subsequently has become clear, Agca was coached for a long time on how to lie and what to lie about.

In this connection I want to say that the Rome investigative division had no justification for Antonov's arrest. It is intolerable that an arrest warrant should be issued on evidence given by a criminal like Agca without preliminary and adequate checking of this evidence to see whether it has evidentiary value. Especially in this case of a most serious accusation--the attempted assassination of a chief of state, a case which naturally has as consequences the deterioration of relations between two states and the discrediting of a respected country like Bulgaria and its people. The facts show that if a preliminary check was made of the evidence, it was superficial, which either signifies irresponsibility or gives rise to other suspicions.

The anti-Bulgarian campaign was, of course, organized in advance too. If it was not organized in advance, how can one account for the fact that Claire Sterling and Paul Henze made a lengthy tour of Turkey, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy and elsewhere (excluding Bulgaria) in order to "tap nine sources," and 2 months before the start of the provocation with their publications began to prepare public opinion to meet a furious anti-Bulgarian campaign without surprise? How, if not as the enactment of an advance scenario, can one account for the fact that as early as September 1982 American television (NBC) had already prepared and broadcast a film likewise for the obvious purpose of focusing public opinion on a "Bulgarian trail" leading to the assassination attempt on the pope and of taking the next step in the preparation of the campaign against socialist Bulgaria?

Something which also attests to an advance plan and organization was the suggestion--no happenstance--of a "Bulgarian trail" in September 1982 by a special committee of the U.S. Congress that was keeping watch on the enforcement of the Helsinki agreement.

And was not the official beginning of the campaign, signalized by Antonov's arrest, also an organized propaganda action? The entire bourgeois press, radio and television precisely on a given signal and in a stentorian voice fell upon Bulgaria and socialism. No doubts or hesitations--the bourgeois propaganda chorus was well directed. Beginning with the choice of time, the stages of development, the so-called "leaking of information," the passing of the ball of lies from Italy to Turkey and thence to the entire West, the stimulation of the campaign with new lies every time it subsided--everything indicated that this anti-Bulgarian campaign was thought out and planned in advance and then kept constantly moving and guided.

I would like to clarify at once that in speaking of an organized propaganda campaign based on the libel of Bulgarian participation in the assassination attempt on the pope, I do not mean that all the journalists of the bourgeois press and Western radio and television who wrote on this subject were consciously part of this organization. Many of them were simply--I would say even conscientiously--performing their professional duties of "pursuing" a story, of looking for what is interesting and passing on the facts and events as they appeared to them. My contention applies to the organization set up by the centers of disinformation and ideological sabotage which have long had an elaborate system and mechanism for feeding their suggestions and imposing them, as they are now imposing the smear against Bulgaria, on the widest possible range of Western mass information media. By "organization" I mean the programming of the bourgeois propaganda machine.

During the past year many facts and circumstances have become known about the Antonov case and about him which have proved beyond a doubt that there was a prepared scenario and staging according to which the provocation and campaign against Bulgaria were carried out. But the advance organization, however painstaking it was, underestimated the strength of the truth.

Spirit and Objectives of the New Crusade

What are the objectives of this anti-Bulgarian and antisocialist propaganda campaign?

The objectives which the creators of the conspiracy are pursuing with this propaganda campaign can be defined very precisely if we bear in mind the complex international situation, imperialism's endeavor to attain military strategic superiority and the search for a pretext for this in the eyes of world public opinion. The campaign is envisaged on a very large and comprehensive scale with objectives ranging widely from the personal sentiments of the people to the strategic goals of imperialism.

Here are some of the objectives:

--Influencing the feelings of the millions of Catholics worldwide and generating an attitude of hatred for the communists who struck at the life of the Holy Father.

--Eliminating the big headlines with the words "inflation" and "unemployment" on the front pages of Western newspapers and replacing them with headlines about a "Bulgarian trail" leading to the assassination attempt on the pope, i.e., distracting the thinking and uneasiness of working people and public opinion from the problems of the economy and the social crisis in the capitalist countries by something different and sensational.

--Transferring terrorism, as our people say, from a sick mind to a healthy one and substantiating American President Ronald Reagan's doctrine that terrorism is not a characteristic and organic symptom of the capitalist world, but is brought in from the outside, from the socialist countries, and they are its instigators and supporters.

--Inciting attitudes among a certain portion of the Polish people in view of Poland's Catholic faith and the fact that Pope John Paul II is the Pole Wojtyla
--attitudes against Bulgaria, the Soviet Union and other fraternal socialist countries at a time when the situation in Poland was obviously calming down and a process of normalization had begun.

--Smearing and discrediting in the feelings and consciousness of many people worldwide the political and economic stability in development, the example and image of socialist Bulgaria and, in general, of socialism as a system.

--And without a doubt the most significant objective of this propaganda campaign is to sow fear and unrest among the West European peoples, to discourage their mass antiwar movement and create an atmosphere of justification for the submissive acceptance in Western Europe of the American Cruise and Pershing-2 nuclear missiles.

Probably there are other objectives, too. The campaign, as I have said, was thought out on a broad and comprehensive scale. But however numerous and diverse these objectives may be, in final analysis they pursue mainly one extremely important effect--that of destroying in millions of people in the West confidence in and respect for the social system and peace-loving policy of the peoples of the socialist community. A campaign with the spirit and objectives of the new crusade that has been declared for the obliteration of communism.

I want to say a few more words about one of the objectives of the campaign--that of misleading world public opinion into thinking that the socialist community exports and supports terrorism in the capitalist countries. It is intended besides to conceal the bitter truth that terrorism is glorified in the national policy and practice of the United States. The whole world knows innumerable examples of this, ranging from terrorism in its domestic politics (assassinations of key leaders and of progressive individuals) to terrorism in its foreign politics (revolutions as in Chile, acts of intervention as in Grenada, lavish provision of weapons and specialists for terror and murders as in Salvador, brutal acts of sabotage such as mining the harbors of Nicaragua . . .).

It is colossal impudence when one knows very well where terrorism is and who is conducting it to accuse others, and to cap it all the United States is now most hypocritically discussing a law against terrorism. Will it sit in judgment on itself!?

It is likewise impudence that the same people who want to accuse the Soviet Union, Bulgaria and other socialist countries of terrorism have discussed and approved the secret report on the problem of terrorism presented by Herr Mayer, the head of West German intelligence himself, to the NATO Council at the beginning of 1982, which states verbatim: "There is no evidence for assuming that there exists an international terrorist network which directs terrorist campaigns worldwide, nor is there any evidence that the USSR plays a leading role in terrorism."

The Bulgarian people are completely dedicated to the job and the idea of creating a developed socialist society and of living in peace. We do not have and we cannot have any part whatsoever in terrorist conspiracies and actions. Terrorism is incompatible with the principles and essence of our policy and of Marxist-Leninist doctrine, which is our banner in the struggle for social progress.

Our attitude towards terrorism is not only absolute negation, but also one of action and contribution to the campaign against international terrorism. Our assistance in neutralizing the terrorists who hijacked the aircraft, in capturing the terrorists and handing them over to the Federal Republic of Germany is well known. Repeated acknowledgment and repeated gratitude for our country's contribution to the campaign against international terrorism have been expressed by the governments and the public of many countries.

Has not a certain deterioration of Bulgarian-Turkish relations also been incited?

As I have already said, the objectives of this campaign are multidirectional so such an intention, pursued by certain circles in the West, must not be ruled out. Some in NATO are annoyed that there exist mutual understanding and good-neighborly and constantly developing cooperation in the most diverse areas between the Bulgarian People's Republic and the Republic of Turkey. They are annoyed over the tranquility and security that have set in in the Balkans and especially over the idea under discussion of our peninsula's becoming a nuclear-free zone, which will be an invaluable contribution to peace in Europe and the world.

But even if among their objectives there is a scheme to disturb Bulgarian-Turkish relations, I cannot imagine that it might succeed. Our good-neighborly relations with Turkey are a matter of principle and have a most promising future; they cannot be affected by the interplay of forces and especially by foreign provocative actions.

As I have noted, the Turkish government takes a highly reasonable and realistic attitude towards provocation and libel regarding criminal contacts between Turkish and Bulgarian citizens. This gives me still greater reason to believe that if the campaign intends to cast a shadow over Bulgarian-Turkish relations and in general over the peninsula, it has no hope. There is and will continue to be good political weather in the Balkans.

Who Are the Alleged Perpetrators?

Let us return once more to Sergey Antonov. The question is: the BTA at once declared Antonov's innocence. If you bear in mind that Bulgaria neither has nor could have had anything to do with the assassination attempt on the pope, have you not equated one person with the state?

There can be no question of equating two entirely different concepts and quantities such as the human being Antonov and the state of Bulgaria. The libel against Bulgaria is personalized through Antonov, for which reason the defense of Antonov and Bulgaria are often simultaneous and in conjunction. But this

cannot and must not be taken to mean that they are identical. Sergey Antonov is one of nearly 9 million citizens of the Bulgarian People's Republic. Our socialist morality assures concern for anybody who has got into trouble through no fault of his own. Especially in this specific instance where a Bulgarian citizen is a victim of provocation not against him personally but against his homeland.

The Bulgarian Telegraphic Agency has declared that Sergey Antonov is not guilty not only because he did not perform and could not have performed the mission of an assassination attempt on the pope, but also because we are convinced of his innocence.

The speedy, but detailed investigations which competent Bulgarian authorities made showed that Antonov did not know, had not met and had no contact with the Turkish terrorist Agca; Antonov did not know, had not met and had no contact with anyone who knew Agca; Antonov was not in St Peter's Square at the time of the assassination attempt and had nothing to do with the attempt on the head of the Roman Catholic Church.

This finding holds true also with full force for Todor Ayvazov and for Zhel'o Vasilev.

That is why we stated that Sergey Antonov is innocent and that both Todor Ayvazov and Zhel'o Vasilev are innocent.

The Bulgarian investigation did not reach this categorical conclusion alone. The inquiry in Rome, which lasted for more than a year, uncovered no evidence, direct or indirect, of participation either by Sergey Antonov or by any Bulgarian citizens at all in this assassination attempt.

The Roman inquiry showed only how false and fictitious the testimony of an international terrorist like Agca is, how untrue and contradictory this testimony is. Even the doctoring of this testimony did not succeed in changing its completely trumped-up and perjured character.

I want to remind you also of a basic legal principle that has existed since ancient Roman law: everybody is innocent until proved guilty. Thus far there is no serious evidence whatsoever of the guilt of Antonov, Ayvazov and Vasilev; to the contrary, there is only evidence of their innocence, and a great deal at that.

And now let me tell the biography of Sergey Antonov. It is very convincing in the matter of his innocence.

Sergey Ivanov Antonov is a young man, born on 11 July 1948 in Sofia. He is the son of a laboring family that originated in the Kyustendil region. He was employed in the Cyril and Methodius National Library where he fetched books requested by readers; he was a lighting technician in the Sofia Dramatic Theater. In 1972 he began to work for the "Balkan" BGA [Bulgarian Civil Airline]. He has a good degree of mastery of French and Italian. In 1975 he was sent for 6 months' training in the "Balkan" agency in Casablanca, Morocco, and since March 1977 he has been employed in the "Balkan" agency in Rome.

He has a secondary education. He took a correspondence course in Bulgarian philology but did not complete it.

Sergey Antonov is married, has a daughter Anna, now 13 years old, and his wife Rositsa is a staff scientist at the Institute of Culture of the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences.

A member of the BCP, Sergey Antonov has a reputation as a modest and hard-working, polite and conscientious employee of "Balkan" BGA.

For the readers of LITERATURE FRONT it may be of interest to add that Sergey Antonov has a predilection for writing poetry. His daughter gave me several pages of his literary efforts, inter alia:

"Long and hard the wind works again and again to build the dunes. The wind wants to build its home and believes it will, but it falters."

Truly a most conventional biography. How then are we to explain why he was the one selected to be the victim of the provocation?

The only sure sign why the choice fell upon Antonov to be the target of the provocation is that as an ordinary airline employee he had no diplomatic immunity, hence could be arrested. This is the main thing that focused their attention on Antonov. The rest is suppositions. Perhaps it was taken into account that as an employee who met and dispatched Bulgarian airplanes at the Rome airport, he met a great many people and this would facilitate imputing nonexistent contacts to him. Perhaps since Antonov had been observed and studied favorably for a long time, the "specialists" in question decided that his education and wit could not withstand their schemes and they would be able to confuse and bewilder him or that his mentality was such that they would be able to break him down and turn him into a manageable tool. Nothing definite can be said other than the logical inference that they sought him out and chose him.

I believe that the "specialists" erred in their analysis and evaluation of Antonov. He has held up for nearly a year and a half now despite his badly shattered health and despite the oppressive and mind-shaking conditions of prison and this inquiry which has lasted so long.

Why have the names of Todor Ayvazov and Zhel'o Vasilev been implicated in the intrigue besides?

No doubt Zhel'o Vasilev figures in the scenario for prestige. So that ordinary people would believe that there was a Bulgarian conspiracy to assassinate the pope and that there was a Bulgarian group in Rome that had done the groundwork for the assassination attempt, it was a good idea that there should be somebody in this group to give the impression of solidity. Most suitable was that it be some military man since the uniform always inspires respect. This was the role intended for Zhel'o Vasilev by the script writers since he was a major and secretary to the Bulgarian military attache in Rome.

As for Todor Ayvazov, I think he was the other (in addition to Antonov) Bulgarian functionary observed for the purpose of being the personal target of the provocation. But for some reason the choice fell on Antonov, while Ayvazov was included so as to make use of the preparation made for him, as well as create an impression of a larger-scale Bulgarian terrorist group in Rome.

Some Western journalists continue to assert that Todor Ayvazov and Zhel'o Vasilev left their posts in Italy prematurely. But it is very well known, especially by the Italian authorities, that Ayvazov and Vasilev were not "called home urgently" to Bulgaria.

In his statement to the BTA on 16 December 1982 Zhel'o Vasilev declared: "I was secretary to the Bulgarian military attache in Rome from 26 November 1979 to 27 August 1982, a period which is within the range of the normal mandate. My replacement waited for an entry visa for 2 whole months, from the beginning of June to the end of July 1982. He arrived in Rome at the beginning of August, after which for about 20 days I introduced him to his official duties. I left Italy on 27 August 1982."

Zhel'o Vasilev's reply is concise and clear in the military fashion.

The case of Todor Ayvazov is more unusual.

Paymaster of the Bulgarian embassy in Rome, he came to Sofia on 5 November 1982 for the traditional annual report and to coordinate the budget for the coming year. His job completed, he obtained an airplane ticket, made a reservation and prepared to travel to Rome on 26 November 1982. But in the morning of 26 November the Bulgarian embassy in Rome was officially informed that there was a warrant for Ayvazov's arrest, of which Sofia had been advised. And thus, already at the airport, Todor Ayvazov found out and remained in Sofia.

What is unusual, even astonishing, about this? The Italian authorities knew that Ayvazov was in Sofia temporarily. Their embassy had issued him a visa and knew that he would be traveling to Rome. Also he had a reservation which could be checked. The Rome investigative division knew or could have known that Ayvazov was returning to Rome on 26 November 1982. Why only hours before this was the warrant for his arrest loudly announced? So that Ayvazov would not return to Rome. This procedure was either a police error or, more probably, the scenario envisaged that Ayvazov as well as Vasiliev would be accused in absentia.

Agca--"Gray Wolf," Neofascist, Assassin

Now let us take a look at the other side, at Mehmet Ali Agca. Who and what kind of person is the pope's assailant?

Much can be said about Mehmet Ali Agca. Although young, he has a copious and criminal biography. To be sure, what I know about him comes from articles in the foreign--and primarily the Turkish--press.

Mehmet Ali Agca was born in 1958 in the province of Malatya, Turkey. He was a poor boy since he peddled water by the pitcher at the railroad station and gathered up lumps of coal that fell from the cars. But he was alert, enterprising and bold. He impressed the local leaders of the nationalist movement and early on was recruited as a member of its "Gray Wolves" youth detachments. Following a few crimes in Malatya, Ali Agca headed for Istanbul. He enrolled as a student with false papers, but more important is the fact that at the behest of his party on 1 February 1979 he murdered an eminent liberal Turkish journalist Abdi Ipekci, editor-in-chief of the newspaper MILLIYET. Arrested after a certain time, Agca admitted the murder. But even before he was sentenced to death, he escaped from the Kartal-Maltepe prison in Istanbul on 23 November 1979. Interestingly, 2 days after escaping from prison, Agca sent a letter to the newspaper MILLIYET in which he declared his intention of killing Pope John Paul II who was to visit Istanbul on 28 November.

After working for a long time in Turkey, the criminal under death sentence, undetected by the Turkish police, with a forged passport crossed Bulgaria at the beginning of July 1980 and visited the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Switzerland, Spain, Tunisia and other countries, finally reaching St Peter's Square in front of the Vatican where on 13 May 1981 he shot and wounded Pope John Paul II.

The Turkish police have a thick dossier on Mehmet Ali Agca with many facts and documents showing that he is "an extreme nationalist and activist of the neo-fascist organization 'Gray Wolves.'" He is characterized besides as a religious fanatic. The membership of terrorist Agca in the "Gray Wolves" was recorded also in the Abdi Ipekci murder trial.

There are differing opinions among journalists about Agca's mental state. Some define him as a psychopath and schizophrenic, others believe that he is entirely normal and an experienced and cold-blooded criminal.

And so Mehmet Ali Agca is a "gray wolf." He himself documented this with his letter written from Munich personally to the "Gray Wolf" leader Colonel Turkes. The letter clearly characterizes Agca and therefore let me cite it: "Esteemed supreme commander," Agca writes to Turkes, "Kissing your hand with profoundest respect, I consider it my duty first of all to express my boundless gratitude for your fatherly concern. I have had no difficulties, thanks to my brother idealists who have warmly welcomed me in their midst and to the all-round assistance they have given me. I feel easy in my mind that I have performed with honor the task assigned me on behalf of the great cause. Most respectfully yours"--signed by Mehmet Ali Agca in his own hand. The letter is appended to the judicial proceedings against Turkes.

An ancient maxim has it: "Tell me who your friends are and I'll tell you who you are!" Therefore when we say what kind of person Agca is, it will be a good idea to see what kind of people his "Gray Wolf" friends are.

The "Gray Wolves" are the youth organization of the Nationalist Movement Party, whose founder was Col (Retired) Alpaslan Turkes. During World War II Turkes was involved with German intelligence and later preached Nazism in Turkey; he

urged the petty bourgeoisie, the craftsmen who had been reduced to beggary, the unemployed and declassed to join the armed storm detachments and prepare to seize power according to Hitler's example. In the 1970's Turkes's "Gray Wolf" storm-troopers organized the massacre of "reds" throughout the country, shooting and cutting down hundreds of teachers in academic institutions, students, workers, progressive politicians and trade-union leaders. The storm-troopers proudly call themselves "Gray Wolves," and their emblem is a gray wolf howling on a rock.

Regarding the "Gray Wolves," the Paris newspaper FRANCE SOIR wrote on 15 May 1981, 2 days after the assassination attempt in St Peter's Square, "Ali Agca is the star assassin of the bloodthirstiest extreme right Turkish organization, the Nationalist Movement Party, better known by the name of 'Gray Wolves,' which is one of the sections of the 'Black Internationale.' The Turkish fascists," FRANCE SOIR continues, "are in contact with the whole world, in most cases through Turkish citizens who work and live abroad. Members of the 'Gray Wolves' act together with West German neo-Nazis, with extremists of the Italian black 'New Order,' in France with the adherents of Mark Frederiksen's former federation for national and European actions, and above all with the heads of 'Our Europe' publishing house."

These are not the "Gray Wolves'" only contacts. There are others as well, very much more interesting and important. In his documentary report "On the Trail of the Wolf" the journalist Iona Andronov of LITERATURNAYA GAZETA indicates the close contacts of the "Gray Wolves" with official representatives of the U.S. administration. These are the highly placed American functionary Paul Henze, for many years chief CIA resident in Turkey; the American "diplomat" in Turkey and the FRG, Ruzi Nazar; the key CIA agent Alexander Peck et al.

The employee of the West German branch in Wiesbaden of the American "institution" by the covername of "New Solidarity," Paul Goldstein, with the strange title of "European expert on counterespionage," told Iona Andronov precisely that the CIA agent Ruzi Nazar, officially an employee in the American embassy in Bonn, was in constant and direct contact with the "Gray Wolves" chief in the FKR, Altay, through whom he directed and controlled the "Gray Wolves." Paul Goldstein's conclusion was that if the "Gray Wolves" undertook the assassination of the pope, this was done with the knowledge of the CIA.

It would be well to know who is financing the "Gray Wolves." On 31 May 1981 the newspaper MILLIYET and other Turkish newspapers reported that on the arrest of Colonel Turkes and search of the Nationalist Movement office in Istanbul documents were found regarding monetary remittances from the United States. The benefactor was the American Walter Jacob Fresish, address 492 West Regayn Street, Monpean Park, California USA, with the covername on the form of "Partito Nazionale Fascisti-Partido Nacional Falango."

This is the sort of person Agca is--a wolf of the "Gray Wolf" pack. It is staggering that an attempt should be made to smirch the honor of the Bulgarian people by struggling to link us with this rabid fascist gang, the first country in

the world with an antifascist uprising, the homeland of the hero of the international antifascist resistance--Georgi Dimitrov, the people from whose flesh and heart the struggle against fascism tore away thousands of most precious victims.

The Much Talked-About Bekir Celenk

There remains one more name very frequently mentioned--Bekir Celenk. Who is he and what is his status?

In addition to Bekir Celenk there are other names in the "case." Of greatest significance is the name of Oral Celik, Turkish citizen, "gray wolf," present whereabouts unknown. The notorious "Interpol" has been unable to discover him. Although Agca did not recognize him, examination of a photograph of St Peter's Square made at the moment of the assassination attempt shows Oral Celik fleeing with a pistol in his hand. This was a great discovery of West German television, but this "trail" is not according to the scenario and therefore remains ignored.

Other names are Omer Baac and Musa Celebi. The former gave Agca at the Milan airport the pistol with which he shot the pope, but Baac maintains that he did not know what the pistol would be used for, still less about the intention of killing the pope. The latter gave Agca money to live on in the FRG, but maintains that he was simply helping a fellow countryman in need. The pair, Baac arrested in Switzerland, and Celebi arrested in the FRG, were extradited to Italy and investigated under Judge Martella in the trial for the assassination attempt on Pope John Paul II.

Bekir is known to us as a merchant who rarely deals with any Bulgarian foreign trade centers. He says that he lives in Istanbul and has made a fortune from trade. In 1966 he left Turkey and continued "to make money" successfully in the FRG, Switzerland, Italy, England and the United States. He bought and sold watches, electric appliances, freighters etc. to the Near East. He has branches of his firm in Munich, London, Bern, Los Angeles and Istanbul. In December 1982 he arrived in Sofia to arrange the sale of Turkish citrus fruit in return for Bulgarian mineral water.

Bekir Celenk was placed under the control of the Bulgarian authorities, for he turned up in Bulgaria at the moment he was declared under suspicion in Italy of complicity in the assassination attempt on the pope. The question arises why "under control" rather than "under arrest." For a citizen to be arrested there must be some definite charge against him. Since we have no charge and no charge from the Italian investigation has been submitted to the Bulgarian authorities, our law does not provide for jailing him. Therefore Bekir Celenk is only under control, which means that measures have been taken to prevent his skipping out; to be more specific, his passport has been taken up, he does not have the right to leave the confines of the Bulgarian People's Republic, and with the interest in him, he is under obligation to be at the disposal of the Bulgarian investigative authorities.

Bekir Celenk declares that he does not know Mehmet Ali Agca and has no connection with the assassination attempt in St Peter's Square in Rome.

A question regarding the illegal extension of his passport has arisen in connection with Celenk. The Turkish consular offices concerned may be able to answer this. But he entered Bulgaria with passport in order with authentic signature and seals, for which reason he has violated no Bulgarian laws.

There has been a great deal of abuse over why we do not send Bekir Celenk to Italy. The fact is concealed, however, that the Italian justice authorities have not requested his extradition. According to international legal relations, in order to request the extradition of a person the grounds for this request must be submitted according to the appropriate procedure. Do the Italian investigative authorities have such grounds or do they not?

The only request for the extradition of Bekir Celenk received so far is on the part of Turkey. According to this request, he is not accused of smuggling weapons and narcotics, as has been said, but of illegal dealing in other commodities and of currency violations. After the question as to whether Bekir Celenk has anything to do with the assassination attempt on Pope John Paul II is cleared up, which is the reason why he is under control in our country, the office of the chief prosecutor of the Bulgarian People's Republic will take up the request of the Turkish authorities for his extradition and rule on it.

Was Agca's Capture Set Up?

Let us direct our attention more specifically to the assassination attempt, the charges against Antonov, his alibi, etc. But first, how are we to explain the primitive character of the assassination attempt that was perpetrated?

The campaign against us has very strongly aroused the imagination of some journalists and especially of some "investigators." They say the attempted assassination operation was long and painstaking in the making; Agca was specially coached; how to get the terrorist away from the square was anticipated, etc. That is to say, a complex operation for what in final analysis was a most amateurish murder attempt. Is it logical for "the highly professional and very experienced" (in Sterling's estimation) "Bulgarian and Soviet secret services" to operate so unprofessionally! And is the abundant experience of the Americans in this regard unknown?

Shooting an eminent personage from a distance of a few meters in the midst of a multitude of 20 to 25,000 people, as in the assassination attempt on 13 May 1981, is extremely unrealistic. Bringing it off cannot be certain because of the crush of the crowd, nor is there a chance of the assailant's escaping. To the contrary, Agca's capture was inevitable.

One thought is that Agca acted alone, on his own judgment as a Moslem fanatic or a maniac who had got it into his head that the world must be plotting against him. There have been frequent assassination attempts against the pope from similar motivations. But this version cannot explain the presence of Oral Celik in the square during the assassination attempt, and with a pistol in

his hand at that, nor can it explain the money that Agca received during an entire year of traveling and living in Europe.

Is not the other idea more probable, namely that he or those who organized the assassination attempt envisaged it precisely so that the assailant Agca would be captured? Do not the mode of operation and the staging of the assassination attempt indicate that Agca's arrest was a set-up? Especially if what some newspapers have said is officially announced, viz. that in his pocket Agca had a note with the telephone number of the Bulgarian embassy in Rome. Then I will be completely convinced of this version.

And of course there is the question: Why should he be captured? For what purpose?

For the purpose of laying the groundwork for the provocation which was perpetrated, and of following it up with a tremendous ideological campaign against Bulgaria, the Soviet Union, the socialist community and system, which actually did follow.

Lies and Reality

What does Agca say about Antonov? Is there any substance in these charges?

Agca does not make charges, he simply lies and smears. From his false testimony others have tried to fabricate charges against Antonov, as well as against Ayvazov and Vasilev.

For more than a year now much has been written not only in the Bulgarian press but also on the pages of hundreds of newspapers worldwide about the lack of substance and the contradictions in Agca's stories about the assassination attempt. Many people are already convinced that Agca is a big liar. But since the Italian magistrates continue to place faith in his slanderous pratings, let me cite some of the many discrepancies and contradictions between reality and Agca's allegations.

--Agca said, "I was in St Peter's Square together with Antonov and Ayvazov. They were supposed to throw a bomb, shoot and create panic so that I could escape."

A great deal of testimony from witnesses proves beyond a doubt that neither Antonov nor Ayvazov was in St Peter's Square during the assassination attempt.

--Agca says, "On both days--11 and 12 May, at the time appointed for the assassination attempt--I visited St Peter's Square together with Antonov and Ayvazov so that we could survey the situation, settle all the details and rehearse."

It has been proved that at these times on 11 and 12 May neither Antonov nor Ayvazov visited St Peter's Square; both were performing their normal official duties, which has been established by many witnesses, including Italian officials.

--Agca says, "I visited the homes of Antonov and Ayvazov repeatedly to discuss the assassination attempt."

On-the-spot inspections and checks have shown that Agca mistook the building where Ayvazov lived, was wrong about the floors and the location of the stairs, and gave a description of Antonov's apartment which was true for the apartment on the floor above where there were accordion folding doors.

--Agca says, "I often talked to Antonov and Ayvazov on the telephone. I addressed them by their secret names. Antonov was called 'Bayryamich.'"

Antonov and Ayvazov did not have telephones in their homes. It is inconceivable that Agca would try to phone them at the embassy or the "Balkan" agency not only because a conspiracy is not made over probably tapped embassy telephones, but also because it is ridiculous to suppose that every last secretary and telephone operator could know that "Bayryamich" was Antonov or be in on the conspiracy at all.

--Agca says, "Sergey Antonov and his wife Rositsa met me at the Piccadilly Restaurant in January 1981."

During the entire month of January 1981 Rositsa Antonova was not in Rome or in Italy at all, but was in Bulgaria.

--Agca says, "Antonov and I talked in English."

Antonov knows no English. He uses only a few English terms which are part of the international terminology in a civil airline.

--Agca says, "On 10 May, a Sunday, 1981 a meeting was held at Antonov's home for a final discussion and decision-making regarding the assassination attempt which we made 3 days later. Participating in the meeting besides me were Antonov, Ayvazov, Vasilev and four of my fellow-countrymen whose names I do not want to mention. Antonov's wife and daughter were present at the meeting besides."

The proved absence from Rome and Italy on 10 May 1981 of both Rositsa Antonova and of the Antonovs' daughter, little Annie, pins down this allegation as a brazen lie and indicates that no such meeting took place. I need hardly consider the naive aspect of this lie, namely, what conspirator would initiate his young daughter into a murder conspiracy; who would hold such a large-scale meeting, and that in an apartment most likely under observation and bugged, as is said of Italy.

These few examples alone are quite enough for anybody to see and understand Agca's falsification. For anybody, of course, with the exception of those who do not want to or who for some reasons say that white is black.

It is not worthwhile, however ridiculous it may be, mentioning the plans for the assassination of the English Queen Elizabeth II, French public figure Simone Veil, Tunisian President Bourguiba, the prime minister of Malta Dom Mintoff and other eminent persons, plans which were meditated between Agca and

"the Bulgarian secret services." This idle tale of Agca no doubt goes beyond his assignment and is a manifestation of his amateur attempt at fantastic tales.

The charge against Antonov and the other Bulgarians is entirely unfounded since it is based from start to finish on Agca's dishonest testimony alone. He could not have fabricated and prepared this dishonest testimony alone, but somebody dictated it to him, coached and continuously guided him.

The main motive for the crime, fabricated by the accusers, is likewise without substance and is at variance with the time of the events: the Polish pope encouraged and supported the counterrevolutionaries of "Solidarity," hence as a measure of normalization in Poland he had to be eliminated. The "Bulgarian secret services," having accepted this "mission" from the KGB, with the assistance of the "Gray Wolves" arranged Agca's escape from the Istanbul prison, talked him into it, coached him and sent him off to act.

In this connection there was an attempt to fabricate a letter from the pope to Leonid Brezhnev, but it was frustrated by the Vatican's categorical denial.

The motive is without substance. Our realistic policy attaches no decisive significance to social phenomena of a personality, even if it is the head of the Roman Catholic Church. For normalization of the situation in Poland it relied and continues to rely solely on the Polish working class and on the correct political orientation of the Polish people.

The motivation is at variance with the time of the events. Some social disturbances in Poland, instigated and exploited by counterrevolutionaries, began on 20-22 July 1980. In July 1980 there was still no "Solidarity," no such name had yet been heard and nobody knew that it would appear.

How could the "Bulgarian services" at that time, back in November 1979, 7 months before this, arrange for Agca's escape from an Istanbul prison, get him to write a letter that he would assassinate the pope, talk him into it, coach him in Sofia, etc.?

The fabricated motive is ridiculously incongruous. But the question of motive is exceptionally serious. Exposing the motive of the crime refutes the charge in essence, root and branch.

Collapse of the Heart of the Insinuation

It made an impression that when I exposed this provocation, I emphasized especially the lie about the meeting on 10 May.

It is true. And this is because, as it happens, it bears upon the collapse of the heart of the frame-up charge. Although Agca's protectors exonerate him for some inaccuracies and incongruities in his descriptions in that they were minor details and it is human to err after so much time has passed, the meeting on 10 May is neither unimportant nor a detail but, as has been said, it was a "decisive meeting" for the assassination attempt. Since 10 people took part

and since the final execution of the assassination attempt was decided the day before, this meeting was a supreme moment in the preparations and there can be no mistake about it; one cannot say, "I don't remember very well." It is no accident that the investigating magistrate Ilario Martella called special attention to this meeting and said, "How come the Turk indicates the dates this way? If it was on 10 May--Sunday, Antonov was not at home. If his wife was not there and the apartment was locked? . . . What would the Turkish accuser do? He would be loudly refuted."

The Turkish accuser was indeed loudly refuted by documents, facts and witnesses proving that Rositsa Antonova and her daughter were in Bulgaria on 10 May 1981. But Ilario Martella did not carry out his declaration regarding the refutation of Agca, from which only one conclusion makes sense--the exoneration and release of Antonov.

Liar Constantly Kept Informed and Coached

How would I illustrate my conclusion that somebody is manipulating Agca?

I would visualize two stages of manipulation. The first was before Antonov's arrest when Agca was instructed what to say and how. The training was long. Agca had to learn names, streets, buildings, dates, circumstances, etc. Another problem was that he did not prove an excellent pupil and discredited his teachers with many mistakes. I make my assertion about Agca's coaching categorically. Since Antonov, Ayvazov and Vasilev had never seen or met him, this is the only explanation why he was able to identify their pictures and play this dirty game at all. The second stage of manipulation was after Antonov had been arrested, when Agca was constantly guided, for purposes of the investigation, on how to change his testimony and how to impede Antonov's alibi.

--Antonov's alibi for the period between 1700 and 1800 hours, the hour of the assassination attempt on 13 May 1981, had been proved. He was in the "Balkan" office and could not have been in St Peter's Square to shoot, throw a bomb, get Agca away, etc.

Despite the obligatory investigative secrecy and despite the complete isolation laid down for Agca, he found out about this alibi of Antonov's and corrected his first testimony by saying, "I have already asserted that I was with Antonov near St Peter's Square until 1600 hours."

--Antonov's alibi for the afternoon of 12 May had been proved. He was in the Bulgarian embassy where he had cocktails and was seen by many people, including Italian officials. He could not be at the same time together with Agca in St Peter's Square rehearsing the assassination attempt.

Despite the compulsory investigative secrecy and despite Agca's complete isolation, he found out about this alibi of Antonov's too and declared to the investigating magistrate, "I have refreshed my memory and I recall that Antonov was not in the square on 12 May."

How did Agca find out precisely when and what corrections to make in his testimony, what new lies to tell? Beyond a doubt because in the course of the investigation he was constantly kept informed and coached.

These doctored changes in Agca's testimony--to be more precise, in his lies, the Italian investigation explained away ridiculously as "an expression of his spontaneity and frankness."

How was Agca instructed and coached?

One method [3-4 words illegible] visits with Agca of the prison chaplain [2-3 words illegible] Father Mariano Santini and of Italian language teacher Giovanni Senzani to the "isolated" Agca. Another method is the visit, admitted by former Defense Minister Lagorio, of representatives of the Italian intelligence services Major Petrucelli and Inspector Bonagura. Perhaps there was yet a third and a fourth method. This is no problem at all. It makes no difference precisely how the stage-managers communicated with their puppet in prison. What is important is the fact which nobody can doubt--Agca was brainwashed, drilled and coached.

To be continued.

[3 May 84 pp 1, 6, 7]

[Text] Terrorist in Sofia?!

Has Agca been in Bulgaria and what is known about this?

No person by the name of Mehmet Ali Agca visited the Bulgarian People's Republic in 1980 and 1981 or in the past 5 years.

Mehmet Ali Agca asserts that he stayed in Bulgaria from the first days of July till the end of August 1980 on a false passport in the name of an Indian citizen Yoginder Singh. This is possible. Among the many people by the name of Yoginder Singh who visited our country in 1980, there is one who came from Turkey and stayed in Sofia in July and August 1980. But if this person was Mehmet Ali Agca, there is a great discrepancy between the data given by him and those recorded for the Yoginder Singh in question.

In his description to the Italian investigation of his stay in Sofia--hotels, location of rooms, telephones, persons etc., Agca cited things which do not exist or are altogether different.

Room 911 of Hotel Vitosha which by now has become notorious could not have been used by Agca for his meetings with Turkish or Bulgarian citizens because in July and August 1980, according to the hotel register, it was constantly reserved by Kuwait, English and other citizens, who are not mentioned at all in the investigation.

Careful checks have uncovered no contacts of Bulgarian officials or of Bulgarian citizens in general with Mehmet Ali Agca or with a person under whose name he might have been passing himself off as Singh, Metin or Ozgun.

I see no significance in principle in the fact that Agca might have been in Bulgaria in July and August 1980. Among the approximately 1 million foreigners who stayed in our country during this period, especially under the no-visa regime then in existence, some may have had false passports; perhaps one of them may have been a criminal. This doesn't mean a thing and cannot be any kind of trail, let alone a trail leading to an assassination attempt on the pope.

Some Western journalists have asked why Agca was not arrested in Bulgaria. Paradoxical question! Though very well known and wanted in Turkey, for several months he was not arrested by the Turkish police. Pointed out specially to Interpol, he was not discovered or arrested by Western European police services for nearly a year. Is it strange he should remain unnoted by the Bulgarian militia to whom nobody had reported anything and who did not know him?!

Price of the Lie

How was Agca bribed to perpetrate this fraud?

How and in return for what Agca was induced to shoot the pope will surely become clear one day. But at present the price of his lies is quite a different matter. What is already very well known is Agca's words, spoken to his official defender, that the people from the "services" who visited him had promised that if he cooperated with them, he would remain in prison for only 10 years. But that alone is not the price. Agca is also compelled to lie to save his own life. He has been told and he understands very well that if they take him out of solitary confinement and put him in a common cell, an outraged Catholic will kill him. There are other methods, too. Agca knows how many murders take place in Italian prisons, hence he is obedient and complies. Life, even in prison, is always very precious.

What Does the Investigation Rely On?

Has the Italian investigation succeeded in finding anything to "nab" him for? How does it justify Antonov's continued detention?

No data as to Antonov's guilt, let alone proofs, are known to have been discovered and established. In principle, they could not find such data because something cannot be sought and found where there is and has been nothing. There can be no proofs of Antonov's guilt because the person Antonov and the action of the assassination attempt are separate and distinct, entirely unknown to each other.

Nevertheless Antonov continues to be held in the Roman prison. This injustice of the Roman magistrates affects the conscience and attitude of many people. For the most natural thing for a person to think is that since he was arrested and held, this means there was something wrong. These people do not know that it is precisely this logic and this frame of human thinking on which the entire provocation and the effect specially sought by the propaganda campaign are based.

When we say whether there is or is not anything incriminating Antonov, I want to remind you of an interview Ilario Martella granted to a BTA representative in Sofia. Regarding the reasons why Antonov had not yet been released, Martella said that some of Antonov's answers were not entirely felicitous. Is not Martella turning his attention to the manner in which Antonov answered? When there is no evidence to support its charge, is the Italian investigation not relying on the "infelicity" of Antonov's answers, i.e. on his confusion? And since confusion is most easily achieved in a state of mental depression, it can be seen how persistently and systematically Antonov is being pushed towards this state.

Bulgarian Cooperation in Discovery of Truth

One of the questions asked was about the legal cooperation established between Bulgaria and Italy, and how important and significant it was.

Guided by the conviction and belief that common sense will prevail over intrigue and conspiracy and over attempts to defame socialist Bulgaria, and guided also by the desire to preserve the traditionally good and friendly relations between Bulgaria and Italy, our country took the initiative in proposing that the judicial and investigative bodies of both states should cooperate in bringing to light the truth regarding the assassination attempt on Pope John Paul II. Despite the fact that there is no agreement between Bulgaria and Italy on legal assistance, the chief prosecutor of the Bulgarian People's Republic Kostadin Lyutov invited investigating magistrate Ilario Martella to our country. The minister of justice of the Bulgarian People's Republic proposed to the Italian minister of justice, under conditions of complete reciprocity, the exchange of information between the counterpart competent agencies of Bulgaria and Italy and the carrying out of joint actions in the territories of both countries to shed light both on the assassination attempt on the pope and on questions relating to illegal traffic in narcotics, currency, weapons and other contraband. This fact by itself eloquently indicates that we have nothing to fear and nothing to hide; on the contrary, we are categorically ready and willing to cooperate in reaching the truth not only regarding the murderous assault on the pope, but also regarding questions of international smuggling, in respect of which likewise we are a target of tendentious lies and smears.

This fact confirms besides our readiness to make our contribution, as we have repeatedly done, to the campaign against international terrorism and in general against international crime.

The investigating magistrate from Trento, Italy--Carlo Parlermo came to Sofia and interrogated Turkish citizen Bekir Celenk quite directly for several days. Investigating magistrate Ilario Martella, accompanied by deputy chief prosecutor Antonio Albano and the chief of the Italian section of Interpol Edmondo Patuto also came. For a week Martella talked directly with Todor Ayvazov and Zhel'o Vasilev, with Rositsa Antonova and the Krustev family, with Turkish citizen Bekir Celenk et al. And both visits concluded with comradely and official declarations by the Italian investigating magistrates that they were fully satisfied with the conditions and atmosphere created for their work by the Bulgarian investigative agencies.

It is not by chance I emphasize that Palermo and Martella talked directly, at first hand, with the persons they wanted to. For international norms and practice envisage the conducting of such interrogations through an intermediary. When the two Turkish investigators interrogated Agca in Roma, despite the fact that Turkey and Italy have a legal agreement and are NATO allies, they were not permitted to interrogate him directly, but only through the mediation of Martella.

Bulgarian investigators--Yordan Ormankov, Stefan Petkov and Yonko Rashkov--likewise visited Rome on an investigative mission, interrogated Agca, talked with Antonov and made on-the-spot inspections and checks.

Beyond a doubt this cooperation between Bulgarian and Italian investigative bodies, instituted at our initiative, is very useful for ascertaining the truth provided that this opportunity is in the hands of independent juridical bodies and persons.

There Is No "Yes" or "No" in Defamation--It Is All the Same

Agca's fabrications about a project for murdering Lech Walesa in Rome with Antonov's participation were exposed. But this question is not treated as settled?

This episode is of exceptionally great significance because it characterizes the machination of the conspiracy against us. Let me venture to separate it into several questions.

Why was this "Walesa murder project" dreamed up? For a dual purpose. On the one hand, since the investigation was obviously collapsing, an additional version was sought and put into operation that would divert attention from the basic version, would compound the intrigue and save the conspiracy. On the other hand, to resuscitate the anti-Bulgarian campaign which had already lapsed into an anemic state, fuel it with a new sensation and with new "shattering disclosures." For an entire week the four Bulgarians who put up at the Rome "Victoria" Hotel precisely on the days before Lech Walesa stopped there were widely written about. After the propaganda effect of this "evidence" was achieved, it was cursorily reported that these Bulgarians were the guests of an Italian construction firm and it had put them up in this hotel.

This reserve reinforcement died out, and very rapidly at that, primarily because no project to murder Lech Walesa existed with either Antonov's participation or knowledge. It collapsed also because Agca took quite a lackadaisical attitude towards this assignment and recited it in a very botched way to Judge Martella. The bomb he described, with which Walesa was to be blown into the air, was so fantastic that despite all their efforts the experts did not succeed in reconstructing anything like it.

What is interesting is why Martella officially accused Agca of slandering Antonov because of this lie. Perhaps he sensed that attitudes ranging from amazement to indignation were beginning to arise in public opinion regarding

the investigation he was conducting. Perhaps he had to do something to preserve his reputation and chose this procedure: "Whenever Agca tells the truth, I will believe him, but when he tells a lie, I will prosecute him." But Martella thus only compounded the already existing conflict between the investigation and the truth.

He could not help creating the impression that despite Agca's many palpable lies regarding the assassination attempt on the pope, in that part of the case Martella did not accuse him of being a slanderer, but proceeded thus only in the instance of the "Walesa murder project," an extraneous case with no direct significance for the trial.

The incrimination of Agca as a slanderer by Martella himself in one part of the trial bears directly on the whole trial of the assassination attempt against the pope and more especially on the charge against Antonov. No line can be drawn between Agca's false and truthful testimony. How and by what criterion will one separate it, especially when the "truthful" testimony is not supported by any proofs? Is not the complete conflict obvious both with logic and procedural norms, as well as with morality and, I would say, with good human conscience? Does Martella contemplate bringing the case to a respected and honorable court and letting the words solely of a terrorist-murderer with the judicial stamp of "slanderer" on his forehead represent the prosecution before the judge and jury! It will be outrageous.

But in this connection, what has happened to the inquiry and when will Agca be judged for his slander? What has happened to the investigation? Who arranged Agca's press conference at the Rome police station, and why? What has happened to the clarification of the disclosures of the Camorristi regarding their visits to Agca? In general, all other trails have been abandoned and only one pursued--the nonexistent "Bulgarian trail."

Not in the Italian--but in the NATO, the American Way

How can I tell whether the conspiracy against us, against socialism was created "a l'italienne," or . . . ?

The visible actions--the assassination attempt, the provocation by the arrest of Antonov, the long inquiry from which information is constantly "leaked"--all this happened in Italy. In Italy there are also several additional side-shows in this theater, like "a Bulgarian trail" and the investigation in Trento of the international traffic in weapons and narcotics that "passes" through Bulgaria, assisted by Bulgarian authorities.

But this anti-Bulgarian and antisocialist provocation and campaign cannot be a conspiracy in Italy alone.

This is what I think, bearing in mind my observations about the mechanism by which the provocation took place and by which the campaign was set in motion. I have already spoken of this: The United States "opened the eyes" of the Italians and indicated that they should follow the "Bulgarian trail." The American mass information media raised the curtain for the future spectacle

and in December 1982 alone published over 1000 items against us, more than had been published about Bulgaria in the United States during the past decade.

My conclusion about the "outwardly Italian" character of the conspiracy is in accordance with the facts, of which there are conclusively many. But there is something else as well that is fundamental.

The objectives of the campaign, which I have already indicated--ranging from support of the Reagan doctrine regarding the socialist source of terrorism in the capitalist countries to the creation of a suitable political atmosphere with the arrival of American missiles in Europe--are objectives which are not of interest solely to the policy of the Italian government. They are goals of general interest to imperialism, in the spirit of the global strategy of the Atlantic military alliance headed by the United States. It is precisely the objectives of the campaign that clearly explain who stands behind the organization of the campaign and clearly indicate that the conspiracy is NATO-, and primarily American-inspired.

Would anybody in Italy himself have assumed the tremendous responsibility for international relations in Europe and the world without holding consultations, without obtaining allied approval and support? Such a decision could not have been made unilaterally. One NATO country cannot initiate a provocation on a world scale, a strike against the relations between the socialist East and the capitalist West that define the present-day world without the direct commitment of the allied center, and particularly of the leading power in NATO--the United States. It is out of the question!

CIA's Double Game

Why then does the CIA distance itself from the case and even express the opinion that there is no "Bulgarian trail" to the assassination attempt on the pope?

It is said that the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency keeps its distance from the "Bulgarian trail" looked for in Rome and almost certainly views these attempts with disfavor and vexation. Is this actually so? How can one judge and assert this? Nothing is known categorically and officially about such a CIA stance!

These stories about "the CIA's distance from the Rome case" have their origin in, and are fueled by language in the famous Western newspaper style about an unattributed suggestion, language such as: "a source close to the CIA states . . ." or "it has been learned that in a CIA report. . ." This is what is known on this subject: phrases with no reliable or responsible source, with nothing precise, clear or certain. Thus it is impossible to assert or believe that the CIA has distanced itself from "the Bulgarian trail" which many are convinced was concocted and created precisely in the CIA laboratory.

Another question is: why were such reports published, why was such an idea launched?

By such stories put out by the CIA, the United States wants to keep the result separate from the campaign. And the result long since emerged: success and failure. The CIA got its way. The smear of Bulgaria and socialism circulated around the entire world and deceived many people. Although this smear has already been discredited and will be utterly exposed here and there, something will remain in some people--such is human nature. And disinformation will see to that.

Failure and its aftermath are left on somebody else's doorstep. When this failure is officially announced, somebody will be at pains to recall that from the very beginning the CIA did not believe this story and will cite old news items about a "CIA report in which. . ." Somebody else will pull the chestnuts out of the fire.

Talking about the CIA, I am reminded of Claire Sterling. In her book she grumbles about the governments of the Western states and their intelligence organizations, and against the CIA as well, for not publicly censuring Bulgarian and Soviet participation in the assassination attempt on the pope. To the contrary, in her opinion, they deliberately refrained and by their silence showed their preference for drawing a veil over this case in the interest of East-West dialogue so necessary for the preservation of world peace.

These "grumblings" of Sterling are a very crafty idea. The sense of it is as follows: with Antonov released (for this will still have to be done), people will be left with the conviction that he was released not because he and his fellow countrymen had nothing to do with the assassination attempt on the pope, but because higher political interests of the times--the preservation of peace--decreed proceeding in this manner. In other words, despite the fact that Antonov's innocence is declared and any "Bulgarian trails" whatsoever leading to the assassination attempt are completely ruled out, despite the fact that this brazen smear fails utterly, many people are left with the belief that it was so; the conviction of Bulgarian terrorism remains. In theory it is not badly contrived, but in practice who will believe this peace-loving gesture? Will those who have studded the world, both dry land and water, with missiles, who have turned Western Europe into a powder keg with their Pershing-2 and Cruise missiles, who for the sake of these missiles perpetrated the Rome provocation, will they sacrifice this ideological column of their crusade? This peace-loving image of the United States that Sterling wants to present to us is ridiculous.

In her book Sterling expresses her apprehension that she will probably be falsely accused of being a CIA agent. I do not want to say something that many have said. Let me ask only how, with this idea of hers that I have just talked about, she can hit precisely on a version so suitable for the CIA for winding up the Rome blunder.

Responsibility for the Proceedings

A question repeatedly asked is: What is your opinion of investigating magistrate Ilario Martella and in general of the Rome investigative division and the prosecutors who are conducting the Antonov inquiry?

There would be no point in my expressing an opinion of the professional and moral character of investigating magistrate Ilario Martella that I have formed from his actions. The declarations made about the absolute independence that Martella and the deputy chief prosecutor of Rome Albano have in their actions and decisions cannot convince me. It is naive to imagine that the responsibility for this case, which is followed with great interest by the entire world and affects the relations not only between two countries, but also between two social systems in the world--that this tremendous responsibility should be left solely to the prerogatives of two judicial officials. It is unlikely. The responsibility lies with and will be borne in higher political quarters.

When Ilario Martella was in Sofia, in conversation he was indignant that he was called "a CIA agent." Martella was once more operating with erroneous information. He has not up till now been described by Bulgaria as a CIA agent. We do not draw such a conclusion from his visit to Langley before he arrested Antonov.

Some time back it was possible to assume the probability that the team of Roman magistrates conducting the proceedings against Antonov were not in on and committed to the conspiracy. It appeared possible that these jurists were simply "hoodwinked" and were unwittingly following the line laid down by the conspiracy. But the frame-up of the proceedings has now become very clear and obvious and since the proceedings have not ceased but, on the contrary, are continuing with great effort, this gives rise to many suspicions that the investigators and prosecutors conducting the proceedings are deliberately playing the judicial role in the conspiracy. And how, in general, are we to explain this constant failure to observe deadlines, this obvious dragging out of the inquiry? Does it not have something to do with adjusting the length of the proceedings to the time needed for the campaign, in view of certain impending events in other countries?!

What manner of person is Martella? Public opinion is observing his actions with attention and such explanations as may be relevant and the time is drawing near for it to pronounce its conclusion.

James Clausen: "Bulgaria's Contribution is Enormous"

Let us expatiate on the subject a little. Since the ideological saboteurs have augmented the campaign against Bulgaria with charges of arms and narcotics smuggling, we shall also include the question: "Where does the trail of this other 'Bulgarian trail' come from"

A great many articles have been published about Bulgarian arms and narcotics smuggling. Television "documentaries" have been made, too. There have been vicious reports on some "symposiums." In general, one more "Bulgarian trail" to smuggling, parallel to that to the assassination attempt on the pope is demonstrated.

Naturally, there is nothing solid and nothing concrete. Not a single fact, case or name that has anything to do with Bulgaria is cited. Television films have shown a Bulgarian international motor-transport truck; later personnel gave out weapons from a pile without our seeing or being shown in any way that these

weapons were unloaded from this same truck. In general, the articles and films are for the gullible. The authors know there are such people.

In the Northern Italian city of Trento an investigation of a big arms and narcotics smuggling scandal has been under way for years in several stages. Already many people have been convicted and others will be put on trial, too. A great many efforts have been made to link Bulgarian trading firms with this scandal and with this investigation, but there was no way to do it and they failed. Out of the hundreds of names in the records of this investigation--Italian, Turkish, Near Eastern, etc., there is not a single Bulgarian one. There is nothing Bulgarian about this case in any regard.

The only connection that was made with Bulgaria, and that is why they sent him, was the visit to Sofia of investigating magistrate Carlo Palermo, in charge of the "Trento case." Signor Palermo came, offered nothing to incriminate us in the smuggling and went home with gratitude for the complete cooperation accorded him. That is all. Yet variations of the theme of "Bulgarian smuggling" continued. Why?

The organizers of the concentrated anti-Bulgarian campaign needed more and more "disclosures," more and more "Bulgarian trails," in order to create an atmosphere of distrust and disfavor around Bulgaria. In this atmosphere, the chief smear--Bulgarian participation in the assassination attempt on the pope--appears more plausible and reliable.

The smuggling stories about Bulgaria are concocted on the analogy of those extraneous effects which stage-managers sometimes use to distract attention or to salvage the poor performance of actors or the play's lack of substance.

The smuggling of narcotics and weapons or of any other banned goods whatsoever is impossible and out of the question as far as any Bulgarian trading firms or any agencies or organizations in Bulgaria are concerned. If this concept can be mentioned in connection with Bulgaria, it is mentioned solely in the sense of the great and universally recognized contribution of Bulgarian customs agencies to the campaign against the international narcotics and arms traffic.

I want to remind you that Bulgaria was one of the first countries in the world to respond to the UN appeal for cooperation in the campaign against the social evil and tragedy of narcotics addiction and immediately took most energetic measures to prevent the passage of narcotics through our country. At our initiative in 1978 and 1980 the First and Second International Customs Conferences on cooperation in the campaign against narcotics smuggling was held in Varna. Two forums which were unanimously judged to be exceptionally useful for enhancing the efficiency of customs control and intercepting the narcotics route.

The efforts and contribution of Bulgarian customs agencies to the campaign against the international narcotics traffic are also confirmed in the following illustrative fact: in the past 10 years Bulgarian customs officials have discovered over 696 attempts to smuggle a total of 17,201 kilograms of narcotics, including 212 kg of liquid hashish, 16 kg of opium, 220 kg of morphine and 137 kg of heroin.

These efforts and this contribution of ours have repeatedly received official recognition and gratitude. Let me cite only three statements.

The recent director of the UN Narcotics Division Prof George Ling: "The efforts which Bulgaria is making to control the illegal traffic have shown clearly that this is helping international society in its aspiration for a better life. By these actions it is taking, it is helping improve the situation of young people in all parts of the world and we in the United Nations are especially grateful for this."

The deputy general secretary of the customs cooperation council up till 1 January 1982, Mr James Clausen: "The contribution of Bulgaria to the campaign against narcotics smuggling is tremendous. The very fact that a small country which has no problem with narcotics has taken the initiative to combat their transit passage in our time is a phenomenon, a remarkable event which deserves praise and gratitude."

The adviser to former U.S. President Jimmy Carter on narcotics questions, Lee Dogolof ; "The Bulgarian contribution to interception of the illegal narcotics traffic is important. The very fact that the Bulgarian government is host to the International Customs Conference on cooperation in the campaign against narcotics smuggling suffices to show Bulgaria's leading role in strengthening international cooperation in this area."

These statements very categorically answer all attempts to link the name of Bulgaria with narcotics smuggling. The very fact that the preferred route for narcotics from the East to the West does not pass through Bulgaria but, as the specialists point out, through the Mediterranean and Italy, shows just who is protecting its borders against this evil.

Arms smuggling. Our firms do not engage in unofficial arms traffic. Our agencies do not permit the illegal passage of arms through Bulgarian territory. This is precise and categorical. If anybody wants to treat as arms smuggling cases where we have aided national liberation movements with arms against colonialism or supplying terrorists with arms, he grossly abuses realities and history.

Bulgaria deals in weapons, in small arms with modest capabilities. The trade in weapons is official, completely legal, of state with state. This is the only way we do business. If this is regarded as blameworthy, by all means, please do so. All statistics in this regard indicate that the United States ranks first with huge quantities. Bulgaria is at the bottom of the list.

Incommensurate Values Not Exchangeable

In a Bulgarian prison there are two Italian citizens whom Italian and other newspapers link with the subject we are talking about. What does their case represent?

This spy scandal is well known. I will say little about it--it is ordinary and clear. In August 1982 before the Shield-82 training exercise of the Warsaw

Pact staffs and troops in Bulgarian territory, Italian citizens Paolo Farsetti and Gabriela Trevisin came to Bulgaria as tourists. They went around to places out of the ordinary for tourists and took a great many snapshots of military targets in the regions. Taken actually to be tourists, they were warned. But when they continued this occupation, serious suspicions arose and they were arrested. Whole masses of films were found on them. When they were projected and copied, it could be seen that among the snapshots not one recorded moments among the beauty spots and sights of Bulgaria, but all focused solely on military subjects only. Naturally Farsetti and Trevisin were hauled before the court, the object and purpose of their interest in military targets was proved and they were convicted.

Such was the Farsetti-Trevisin case. As I said, it was ordinary and clear. But it was and continues to be used for serious abuse and insinuations against our country.

One insinuation is that we arrested Farsetti and Trevisin so as to have "merchandise to barter" for Sergey Antonov.

We could not have readied "merchandise for barter," for Farsetti and Trevisin were arrested on 26 August 1982 when nobody in our country could have supposed that 3 months later, on 25 November, Antonov or any Bulgarian at all would be arrested in Rome. If we knew about and anticipated such an arrest, why did we have to provide for an exchange? Would it not have been more normal for Antonov to have come home to Bulgaria!

The second insinuation is that we suggested and conducted secret negotiations with Italian representatives to exchange Paolo Farsetti and Gabriela Trevisin for Sergey Antonov.

Nobody on the part of Bulgaria has made such a proposal either directly or indirectly and nobody has conducted such talks. Nor can there be any question of equating a conventional spy case, of which Farsetti and Trevisin are the principal characters, with a political provocation, the victim of which is Sergey Antonov. We cannot exchange spies for an innocent person. The cases are different and completely opposite in character and nature.

Italian Government and Roman Investigation

What are my impressions of the conduct of the Italian government?

Let me single out some representatives from the previous cabinet of ministers such as Minister of Defense Lelio Lagorio who has made some amazingly committed and extremely impolitic statements in the parliament. The current Italian government is officially holding aloof and has not declared its attitude towards the Antonov case. Its procedure is to wait for the final result and abide by the principle that guilt or ~~innocence~~ innocence can be declared solely by the court.

From this position the Italian government has taken some initiatives to normalize Bulgarian-Italian relations not only in the diplomatic sphere, but also in

traditional cultural and economic cooperation between the two countries. A while back, as a result of a conversation during the Stockholm conference, diplomatic relations between Bulgaria and Italy were normalized. There is a Bulgarian ambassador again in Rome--Rayko Nikolov, and an Italian ambassador in Sofia--Giovanni Batistini.

I respect the social system in Italy, but in this alarming case seriously affecting the political climate in Europe and the world, I cannot understand or grasp this official neutrality and passive observation of the Italian government. I am convinced that a more specific interest on the part of the Italian government in the Antonov matter would be conducive to a speedier and fairer solution of the case and would frustrate the ability of certain powers to bring influence to bear on it. The active attitude of the Italian government alone would contribute to clarifying the truth and to full normalization of traditional friendly Bulgarian-Italian relations and to the substantial improvement of relations in Europe.

Return to Prison a Psychological Blow

How can we consider the placing of Antonov under house arrest and later his return to prison?

When Antonov was taken out of Rebibbia prison and placed under house arrest, I voiced amazement and indignation on Bulgarian radio that he had not been released altogether. When the attempt to accuse him had collapsed and when the investigation had failed--despite persistent search--to discover any confirmation of Agca's "confession," there could and should have been only one result: Antonov's immediate and final release with fully established innocence. Such is the behest of the law, of human morality and right, of the necessity to put an end to this monstrous provocation.

Many journalists of both Eastern and Western countries reacted thus. Other colleagues with understandable logic accepted and assessed Antonov's house arrest as a certain transitory period before his final release. Immediately or in the future, but all saw Antonov released!

But lo and behold--instead of his release--prison again. Antonov's house arrest, decreed because of the grave condition of his health on the recommendation of an official expert medical report, was terminated without a new medical specialists' report. Apart from morality and humane norms, the procedural code was violated, too.

Why did this happen? Bearing in mind that the decision for Antonov to spend one more day in house arrest was protested by the Roman prosecutors and knowing the conflicts that had arisen between the prosecutors and the court at the appellate level, as well as certain other symptoms, I gain the impression of differences among the persons and institutions which were dealing with the Antonov case. Not that I see two opposed groups taking shape--hawks and doves, as somebody has said; absolutely not. The point at issue is differences in style and approach, in the search for a way to perform the task, in the desire

of some to preserve their reputation in society. Differences in this sense only. Otherwise, unquestionably they all obeyed and complied with the will of the big hawk.

Some have interpreted Antonov's temporary deliverance from Rebibbia prison as necessary in order to avoid the delicate situation of his not being there during the visit of Pope John Paul II and his meeting with Agca. Such an assumption is possible even though the pope visits the guilty and the convicts, but Antonov was neither guilty nor a convict.

I am convinced that Antonov's return to prison was intended to deal a knockout blow not only to his physical health, but also and primarily to his mental stability.

If there is any orientation in the conduct of the trial, it presupposes not one, but a series of psychological shocks for Antonov. This lets him understand that he is completely in their hands; whenever they want, they will take him out; whenever they want, they will put him back in prison. Italian newspapers have begun to say, so that Antonov will read it as well, that for his act--an assassination attempt against a head of state--Italian law provides life imprisonment. Another and another psychological blow will follow.

In any eventual trial the organizers of the conspiracy will have nothing else to rely on than the spiritual annihilation of an innocent defendant.

Pope's Meeting with Terrorist

Among the questions there is also the suggestion, "Please comment on the meeting of John Paul II with his assailant Mehmet Ali Agca."

I would like to ~~emphasize~~ ^{emphasize}, to begin with, that good business relations have existed and been maintained between Bulgaria and the Vatican for a long time. Apart from periodic useful contacts, the last of which was Monsignor Luigi Poggi's visit to our country, the Vatican traditionally every year on 24 May receives a Bulgarian cultural delegation, which offers flowers in tribute at the tomb of Cyril the Philosopher in the basilica of San Clemente and expresses the esteem of our people for the great accomplishment of the creators of the Slavic written language--the brothers Cyril and Methodius. I cannot help but note that last year John Paul II received our delegation, expressed his esteem for the Bulgarian people and sent greetings to the chairman of the State Council of the Bulgarian People's Republic. On the other hand, it is illustrative of the character of the Bulgarian attitude that Comrade Todor Zhivkov is the first general secretary of a communist party of a socialist country who visited and met with the then pope in the Vatican.

I have pointed out the mutual respect of Bulgaria and the Vatican and I want to say besides that despite the complex situation created in connection with the anti-Bulgarian provocation in Rome, which is in direct correspondence with the Holy See as well, Bulgaria has preserved its attitude towards the Vatican.

Commenting on John Paul II's meeting with Mehmet Ali Agca is a delicate matter. Some have done this, but in connection with the publication in the Turkish newspaper HURRIYET of the conversation between the pope and the terrorist, decoded by specialist lipreaders, a reaction came from Vatican circles (news item in the newspaper STAMPA) that such "an invasion of the intimate world of the pope" is unforgivable.

I am averse to such audacity, but I think I would not be violating the propriety due the Holy Father if I frankly share a thought that troubles me.

I was impressed by and have pondered the phrase, "invasion of the intimate world of the pope!" Can any act in the "intimate world" of a personage like the head of the Roman Catholic Church fail to have repercussions and affect the "secular, civic world"? I believe it was very long since established that any utterance of highly placed personages like the pope, however personal it may be, always produces an impact and an attitude in society, especially if the pope's personal conduct has to do with something which by and large has engaged the widest public interest such as the assassination attempt on him on 13 May 1981.

Actuated no doubt by a sense of magnanimity, Pope John Paul II had a meeting with the assailant who shot him, and for the third time gave him his forgiveness face to face. An expression of lofty love of humanity befitting a pope. But this gesture could not be left alone within the walls of the cell, could not be left alone in the sense that the victim forgave his attacker. Nor was it. It evoked a very great response within world public opinion ranging from approval or amazement that the pope should oversimplify Agca's entire criminal career to the interpretation that he was expressing moral support of Agca's present actions.

Actually probably by the same magnanimity that brought him to Agca's cell, after the meeting John Paul II pronounced the portentous words, "I have talked with my brother whom I have forgiven and who enjoys my full confidence."

These words with undoubtedly pious intention did not remain there in the prison either, were not limited to the pope's "intimate world," but circulated over the entire world, with all the meanings and suggestions to which they might give rise. And one of them was that if the pope has full confidence in Agca, he is therefore telling the truth.

That is why, as regards the pope's meeting with Agca, I think how easy it is when highly placed personages take some action for it to result in consequences the opposite of what they intend, even when we want to believe that this was not deliberately sought.

What Kind of Trial Should There Be in Rome?

The latest reports coming from Italy prompt the question whether there will be legal proceedings against Antonov.

There are absolutely no reasons, no grounds for action to lie against Sergey Antonov. For nearly a year and a half--interrogations and confrontations, comparisons and on-the-spot viewings, analysis of photos and of witnesses' testimony--nothing has led to a single fact which supports even in the slightest the allegations of the assassin Agca that he knew and was aided by Antonov. On the contrary, during the investigation many discrepancies were established between Agca's "confessions" and reality; many facts and documents were discovered which refute the lies he was fed and coached on, but these are the sole specification of the charge of Bulgarian participation in the assassination attempt.

The investigation of Antonov has no legal basis; there is no investigative error and still less a normal investigative verification of evidence. Antonov's arrest and the charge against him and other Bulgarians are a gross provocation for the purpose of backing up a camouflaged political and ideological anti-Bulgarian and antisocialist campaign.

Now that it has become very clear that Antonov and Bulgarians in general had no connection with the attempt on the life of Pope John Paul II, it is high time that justice should triumph. There is nothing for which Antonov should be tried and he should be released without delay--unconditionally and completely because he is entirely innocent.

There must be a trial in Rome, it is mandatory, though not the kind that some desire, of Antonov, but rather a trial of Agca as slanderer, and a most despicable and manipulated slanderer at that. There must be legal proceedings against him and against those in whose interest he has lied, who have taught him and procured "evidence" for him! There must be legal proceedings against the organizers and perpetrators of the provocation!

I do not rule out the likelihood that Antonov will be prosecuted in Rome. Not, I repeat, because there is anything he should be tried for but because, as I have repeatedly said, this campaign is envisaged for long-term effect. A trial which can be nothing other than a farce offers an opportunity for loud repetition of all the smears thus far uttered against our country and other socialist countries, for seizing public attention anew, and for the campaign thus to exploit the Roman provocation to the hilt and multiply its political and ideological effect.

Another question is that in legal proceedings against Antonov world public opinion will see the entire lack of substance and the absurdity of the charge and that the outrage of one of the most scandalous political provocations of our times will be exhibited.

Bulgarian Public Opinion on Provocation

What are my impressions on how Bulgarian public opinion has met and how it sees this provocation? What troubles it, what does it think?

Bulgarian public opinion has followed with very great attention every event and report in connection with the provocation in Rome and in general the entire

propaganda campaign organized against our country. It knows everything, is fully informed. There is no significant fact, circumstance, statement or commentary published abroad of which it has not been advised in the Bulgarian press and especially in BTA express editions. It is known also that Bulgarian television has shown a complete documentary recording of two press conferences with Bulgarian and foreign journalists at which the "Bulgarian trail" leading to the assassination attempt on the pope was discussed.

That is why the Bulgarian Telegraphic Agency has received thousands of letters from Bulgarian citizens everywhere, of different ages and occupations. Summarization of these letters would result in many valuable conclusions about the sociopolitical thinking of our people, about their awareness of justice and their sense of responsibility and patriotism. But now let me indicate only a few of my impressions, and those very briefly.

Bulgarian public opinion is greatly disturbed and alarmed over the fate of Sergey Antonov. Disturbed not only because Antonov is a Bulgarian, but first and foremost because an innocent person in a serious state of health is in prison.

Bulgarian public opinion is profoundly indignant and strongly protests the brazen slander and provocation. It is shaken by the cynicism of the conspirators. And I think that nobody heretofore has done so much to depict clearly and conclusively the monstrous nature of imperialism as these conspirators have done by this malefaction of theirs against us.

I think besides that this provocation seriously reminds the Bulgarian people of the existence of the class struggle in the world and has also become an occasion for the spontaneous expression of their sense of patriotism, so profound and strong.

Capital against Socialism: Crusade of the Cross and of the Missile Launcher

I have familiarized myself with the materials and announcements, newspaper reports, broadcasts, commentaries, books, with everything--pro, neutral and con--that has been published or transmitted in the world regarding the investigation of the assassination attempt on the pope and regarding the attitude towards the attempt to impute a "Bulgarian trail" to this assassination attempt.

Analysis of the facts, of the mechanism and realization, of the means used and the result sought by the provocation leads me to the following conclusion.

The version of a "Bulgarian trail" to the assassination attempt on the pope and to other smuggling and terrorist scandals; the arrest of Bulgarian citizen Sergey Antonov in Rome and the investigation of him, Todor Ayvazov and Zhel'ov Vasilev; and the exceptionally large-scale, energetic and loud propaganda campaign against Bulgaria, the Soviet Union and in general against the social system of socialism is

/A conspiracy/ [in boldface]--fabricated, prepared, constantly guided, and envisaged for long-term effect.

/A conspiracy/ [in boldface] which uses the assassination attempt on the pope, but is actually a propaganda assassination attempt, an act of political and ideological terrorism against socialist Bulgaria.

/A conspiracy/ [in boldface] which is a form and manifestation of the class struggle of capitalism against socialism.

/A conspiracy/ [in boldface] which is imperialist, with diversionary objectives in general against democracy and social innovation, trust and cooperation among nations, the tranquility and peace of mankind.

The purpose of the Roman provocation and the ideological sabotage thus engineered are completely identical with and precisely in the spirit of the global objectives of the crusade against communism, declared and led by the President of the United States.

I said "crusade" and reflected: Does not the crusade declared by Mr Reagan contemplate also using other modern weapons against us? Instead of crosses and gonfalons, do they not carry in the vanguard deadly nuclear missiles? Imperialism's crusade of the cross is also the crusade of the missile launcher.

But whatever it may be, socialism will stop it and send it back precisely where it came from.

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CSO: 2200/122

DEFENSE DEMANDS BETTER ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE

Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech 8 Jun 84 p 4

[Article by Oldrich Cechak, Csc, of the Klement Gottwald Military Political Academy in Bratislava: "Certain Aspects of Economic Protection of Defense"]

[Excerpts] The meetings of the communist and workers parties analyzed the nature of changes in the world occurring in the second half of the 1970's and at the beginning of the 1980's. It was noted that the basic trend in the development of conditions abroad has been the strong deterioration of international political and economic relations and a further increase of imperialist aggressiveness.

The present tendency of the United States and its NATO allies to achieve a "full and irreversible" military supremacy as a precondition of "direct military confrontation" with socialist countries is being quite openly proclaimed as the key official military-strategic orientation. Extensive measures have been adopted which, by their orientation, complexity, volume, and structure represent a completely new quality in the post-war development of American preparations for war against the socialist countries.

The consistent peace policy of the socialist countries postulates a continuous effort to assure the defensive capability of the socialist camp. That effort has an objective character which involves the whole of society and comprises a broad complex of activities of party, state, economic and social organizations designed to fortify the material and spiritual foundations of the battle-readiness and preparedness of the armed forces. In the complex of factors which determine the level of readiness of these armed forces and the defense ability of the country and the coalition, the economy is of decisive importance.

To insure the defensive capability of Czechoslovakia under these circumstances, it is imperative to achieve an optimal scale, structure, and pace of economic preparations, based on a scientific analysis of possible variants of military-political, scientific-technical and economic development. At the same time, it is necessary to keep in mind the fact that the demanding processes of the economic protection of defense occur in a stage of building developed socialism; that fact in itself requires the realization of a

variety of complicated socioeconomic tasks. In accordance with the conclusions of the 16th CPCZ Congress, it is primarily a matter of ensuring a continuous general evolution of the socialist society, of improving living and working conditions of the people and of increasing their activity.

"The consequences of the present international development," said Gustav Husak at the Ninth Plenum of the CPCZ Central Committee, "have an impact on all our activity, on the solution of questions of economic development, on the sphere of political education, and other sectors. We have to continue to observe world events carefully and without panic, but without cheap optimism as well."

This conception of proceeding towards developed socialism also organically comprises the creation of the necessary conditions to increase the defensive capability of the CSSR in the coming years. Its level is in fact substantially predetermined by the overall economic potential of the country, by the measure of exploitation of intensification factors in economic development, by the adequacy of the managerial, branch and sectorial structure, by the degree of international integration, by the productivity, efficacy, vitality, and resistance of the economy and by other, mainly qualitative, indicators. The degree and pace of realization of the general line of building developed socialism, and of the strategic orientation toward the effectiveness and quality of all work, are therefore directly dependent not only on the strengthening of social guarantees for the working people, but also on the creation of an economic platform for the defense of the socialist fatherland and the coalition.

In analyzing the above-mentioned relations, we have in mind not only the further growth of the national income in its socially desirable dimension, factual structure and quality, but above all the increase of socioeconomic efficiency of production by means of intensification. Its fundamental significance lies not only in economizing with resources and creating additional potential for the growth of the production and non-production sphere, but, as is well known, primarily in loosening up the growth correlation between the dynamics of production and the dynamics of mass societal labor. The result is an increase of the net material product relatively independent on the increase of resources. And it is exactly this type of economic development that is able to create decisive prerequisites for securing the defense of socialism and the dynamic military-strategic balance between the states of the Warsaw Pact and NATO, as the primary prerequisite for the preservation of peace.

The Communist Party of Czechoslovakia is therefore fully justified in presenting the demand for a higher pace of intensification as most topical and urgent. The postulation by our class enemies of an economic collapse of the socialist countries and of a breakdown of military-strategic and military-technical equilibrium are indeed based on an unfounded assumption born of wishful thinking: namely, that we will not be able in the coming years to master in time and successfully the complicated transition processes leading to a higher quality of socialist production methods. They assume that the

entanglement of internal development problems, together with another round in the arms race, will place the socialist countries before a complex of unsolvable questions and result in their abandoning a principled internal and international policy or even lead to political chaos.

The conclusions of the congress and other party documents affirm unequivocally that such speculations are entirely pointless. The individual socialist countries are capable of mobilizing considerable material resources and social and spiritual forces, forming a reliable base for their universal development. By applying the results of scientific and technical progress under conditions of socialist production, and by economic cooperation within the framework of the CEMA, they have the capability of increasing considerably the productivity of the whole society.

12707

CSO: 2400/340

GOOD CONDUCT CERTIFICATES AVAILABLE BY MAIL

Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 16 Jun 84 p 21

[Article: "Good Conduct Certificates Available by Mail in 8 Days"]

[Text] Starting on 1 July, the Interior Ministry will issue good conduct certificates to requestors through a much faster and simpler process. The certificates are needed for certain jobs and appointments. At yesterday's press conference, Dr Karoly Nagy, a lieutenant colonel of the police, and chief of the Interior Ministry's investigative department, gave reasons for the changes and summarized the essence of the modifications.

The updated procedures were made necessary, among others, by the great increase in the demand for the good conduct certificates. Five years ago they still only issued 200,000 such certificates, last year it was already 500,000. The growth is related to the increase in the number of small enterprises, economic groupings and CB radios. Previously, Hungarian citizens and certain foreigners had to report to their respective police stations to request the good conduct certificate, which they picked up at the same place 14 to 21 days later. According to some at the Interior Ministry, after 1 July the process will take only 7 to 8 days. This is achieved by centralized and computerized processing.

In almost 2 weeks, those who want a good conduct certificates will not have to go to the police station. One can buy the applications at the post office for 15 forints, fill it out according to his identity papers, put a 50 forint document stamp on it, and mail it. As mentioned before, the ministry will send the good conduct certificate back via registered mail within 8 days. A potential unfavorable response cannot fall into unauthorized hands, since only the addressee can sign for the mailings. Those who may need more certificates, for example if they are applying for four or five jobs, have to buy and submit four or five application forms.

The good conduct certificate is regarded as a state administrative decision, and can be appealed, despite its content, using the proper legal channels. Organizations requesting the certificate can avoid needless inconveniences by comparing the data in the certificate to data in personal identity papers. A certificate which is used 3 months after its issue is not valid.

They reenforced the following point at the press conference: work places and occupations requiring good conduct certificates will in the future continue to be designated by ministers and groups with nation-wide authority. The Interior Ministry will only perform official duties in this sphere.

The new application forms will be available for purchase starting 1 July in Budapest, county capitals and in major cities at about 300 post offices.

CSO: 2500/412

BRIEFS

SERBO-CROATIAN, GERMAN-LANGUAGE CAMPS--A reading camp for children of South Slav nationality opened Monday in Bar township on the banks of the Danube. Fifty Serbo-Croatian elementary schoolchildren will take part from the counties of Baranya, Somogy, Tolna and from Pelmonostor in Yugoslavia. The first language camp in the country was founded in our most diverse county, Baranya, for Serbo-Croatian and German children. The caretakers of the camps are the local South Slav library of Mohacs and the local German library of Pecs. This summer is the ninth time that the minority nationality children are together at the camps, organized by the local libraries, on the banks of the Danube. The goal of the language camps is for the children to master their mother tongue, its rules and beauties. Therefore, the recently opened camps have library sessions, where they act out Serbo-Croatian literary works and meet South Slav poets from Yugoslavia and Hungary. Furthermore, they learn South Slav songs and dances. In the second half of summer, German-speaking children go to the camp near the Danube. Boys and girls from the German settlements of the Trans-Danubian counties attend the camp. [Text] [Budapest MAGYAR MIRLAP in Hungarian 12 Jun 84 p 8]

CSO: 2500/395

GENERAL STAFF OFFICERS DISCUSS NATO, ROLE OF POLAND

Comments of General Sliwinski

Krakow GAZETA KRAKOWSKA in Polish 11-12 Feb 84 pp 3, 4

[Report by Teresa Betkowska on an appearance by Gen Jan Sliwinski (division rank), member of the General Staff of the Polish People's Army, before the "Krakow Kuznica" club]

[Text] The general began his speech as follows:

--"I will talk to you about the growing threat of war and about our struggle for peace, in the context of Poland's efforts to ensure the security of the Polish People's Republic, and also about the current state of negotiations on a reduction in the arms race and disarmament..."

Then he added:

--"I do not want to frighten you. I will cite arguments which should convince those present that the situation is really serious. And I would prefer that everyone use his common sense. Also that the words of Horace, 'DULCE ET DECORUM EST PRO PATRIA MORI' (Lovely and honorable it is to die for one's country) should rather be

lovely and honorable it is to live in one's country and for one's country."

The general came to the Krakow meeting well-prepared: several typewritten pages, slides ready for a projector ("...what rotten luck," one of the club members said. "Here we are supposed to be talking about modern technology and an ordinary light bulb has burned out in our projector and unfortunately we do not have another one."). And then the general said, "I thought about how I would describe to you the problem with which I am involved on a daily basis in the Ministry of National Defense. I would rather not repeat what has already been published. But at the same time, among the many problems none that are crucial can be ignored... If you are interested in the specifics of disarmament negotiations I will try to answer your questions... I think it would be well for us to speak frankly here in this friendly atmosphere."

General Sliwinski's speech lasted 45 minutes.

The discussion lasted twice as long. Many questions were asked of the General Staff representative. And it is the custom in the club to reply and to argue. In a word: to share opinions. And if the bag of problems turns out to be heavy? That is how it is when some are interested in the defense posture of our country and others are interested in the classification of military weapons into tactical or strategic, and still others are interested in the expenditures for armaments. Someone in the hall even asked the guest speaker to outline a scenario for a film of "The Day After" type, from his (the speaker's) point of view. ("...I would rather be a film editor and make a film of the documentary type, showing actual photos of the explosion of the atom bomb in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, photos of the destruction of Warsaw and Gdansk. There would also be films of the exercises being conducted currently in Nevada... It would be a terrible picture of the world after the shots are exchanged. And it would be very, very real. In this film I would say why the socialist countries have undertaken a struggle for peace. Because we are not imagining--we know what this war will be like...")

But I shall not report the discussion, although it turned out to be extremely interesting. For those who were not able to hear the Warsaw guest of the "Krakow Kuznica" I will cite some of the more important themes and parts of his speech.

--"...We find ourselves in an area of the greatest accumulation of threat since the Second World War, which gives us great concern..."

With this statement (and let us recall that the same words were spoken by Wieslaw Gornicki) the general focused the attention of those present on a situation which has grown much worse recently: --the turn to the right in Western Europe; --the start of the installation of American medium-range missiles in the FRG and Great Britain; --the striving of the United States to make itself the strongest military power; --the disciplining of United States' allies and imposing upon them a large part of the burden of armaments; --the striving to protect the lucrative interests of the military-industrial complex; --the fanning of old political animosities in Europe by exposing German revisionism and questioning the decisions made at Yalta and Potsdam.

Along with these actions the government circles in the United States have taken concrete steps to... remove the nuclear danger from the American continent! And move it to another area. Especially to Europe.

The Reagan administration has also taken steps aimed at overthrowing the opponent, i.e., the Warsaw Pact, with no great detriment to itself, by making it possible for the existing strategic balance to collapse in favor of the United States.

So much, for the purposes of brevity, for the intentions of our opponents.

What are our reactions to such actions taken by the United States and NATO?

General Sliwinski talked about the suspension of negotiations on strategic arms, on the reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe. He talked about the known military movements on the part of the USSR.

It is no secret: a situation has arisen which portends no improvement in 1984-1985. It opens the door to escalation of the arms race and the growing threat to international and European security and the Warsaw Pact.

Poland has become the object of strong pressure from NATO!

--so spoke the Polish People's Army general, documenting his statement as follows: The threat to Poland grows as more and more weapons are deployed in Western Europe. In addition, he added, all of this is accompanied by an attempt at political isolation--the blocking or hindering of economic contacts and the imposition of various types of repressions and sanctions.

The sources of the antagonistic tensions are various. The most serious is the conflict between the two opposing sociopolitical systems. This conflict is of a confrontational, multifaceted nature. "And it pertains to ideology, politics, economics, propaganda, culture, mentality, minds and hearts," the general added, stressing that this struggle between capitalism and socialism fundamentally shapes the course of events and delimits the boundary of East-West relations. The capitalist countries, for example, promote an ideology which takes the form of fierce anticommunism and a policy which takes the form of antisovietism. They provoke economic and political confrontation and escalate the arms race. In short, the primary goal of the United States and NATO is the weakening, and then the destruction, of socialism. Militarily, this is done by a policy of strength from a position of military domination. Also the attempts of the United States to gain superiority over the USSR and to make it possible to achieve victory in any war--nuclear or conventional!

Are all of these concepts being realized? This question may be asked, because Gen Sliwinski in his speech said:

--"... the realization of these concepts is hindered by an approximate strategic balance; the strength and position of the USSR and the Warsaw Pact make large problems in East-West relations insoluble by 'strength', through war. They become unprofitable and absurd."

It is a truism to repeat here: how the current strained situation will be solved will depend on US-USSR relations, i.e., the countries with the largest military, scientific-technical and economic potential.

To talk about restraints is to talk about negotiations.

The prevention of a catastrophic war rests on bilateral and multilateral treaties and agreements, many of them entered into for an unlimited period.

The speaker spoke of the bases of US-USSR relations. He spoke of the agreements concluded with the Soviet Union with France and Great Britain.

Among the most important bilateral agreements he mentioned those dealing with:

--the bases of relations between the United States and the USSR (concluded in 1972),

--the prevention of incidents on the open seas and the air space above them (concluded in 1972),

--the prevention of nuclear war (1973).

But the truth is that in the West tendencies to undercut the existing treaties are becoming increasingly apparent.

On the day that General Sliwinski spoke to those gathered at the meeting in "Kuznica", the Polish press published a Soviet Union aide-memoire in which the attention of the American side is called to their negative actions in arms reductions and the fulfillment of legal and political obligations in this regard. We read the following paragraph: "In the United States an unprecedented, from the standpoint of size, 'comprehensive strategic program' for the 1980's has been approved and is being implemented. This program provides for the accelerated development of new strategic offensive weapons systems, such as the MX intercontinental ballistic missiles, the 'Midgetmen,' atomic-propulsion submarines armed with Trident missiles, B-1b strategic bombers and 'Stels', a multipurpose space shuttle system, and long-range maneuverability projectiles fired from air, land and sea."

Brrr!!!

The women giving birth in the film "The Day After" said: "... after all, we have been talking about armaments for 40 years, and so we knew what we could bring about. And yet we brought it about."

Alberto Moravio, in the interview already mentioned, said the following: "Today, for the first time in our history, we can no longer talk in terms of individual death, personal fate, but rather in terms of ecological death, the collective danger that hangs over our heads (...) Man made the bomb, therefore man must dispose of it. Unfortunately, it will be easier to get rid of war than of this weapon (...) In the face of a radioactive cloud, nationalism makes no sense (...) Public opinion must realize this also (the danger of arming--author's note) and use its entire strength of persuasion!"

The guest at the "Krakow Kuznica" said that the following factors have a fundamental influence on ensuring security in Europe and in the world:

--the inviolability of borders,

--the unalterability of the territorial and political status quo which arose as a result of the Second World War,

--the approximate military-strategic balance between NATO and the Warsaw Pact,

--the impossibility of gaining a superiority in mass-destruction weapons which would enable the enemy to arm himself unilaterally and with impunity to provoke a world cataclysm,

--the observance of existing treaties, agreements, and understandings and generally accepted standards of conduct.

He also stressed strongly that any attempt to destabilize these factors is conflict-producing. "States of different sociopolitical systems have no other reasonable alternative than peaceful coexistence and rivalry, than alleviation of tensions and elimination of the threat of war," concludes this theme, once more demonstrating to those in attendance that the adversaries are striving for goals that are totally different from ours, and that the foundation for these contemplative solutions is to be prepared by aggressive ideological-propaganda campaigns, whose task it will be to "soften up" the core of the Warsaw Pact by action which will lead to economic and financial erosion. Also the striving to gain military superiority over our community.

Military superiority. Expenditures for armaments. And again the obvious truth:

Every new generation of weapons is many times larger than the previous one.

And so expenditures for NATO's military goals are increasing. During 1966-1970 total expenditures were 500 billion dollars, but for 1980-1985 they will total 1 trillion 700 billion dollars!

The escalation of the arms spiral!

Let us not allow ourselves to be lulled. Let us be vigilant (appeals General Sliwinski).

Credo: Let us seek solutions by political means!!! Political means flow out of the essence of socialism and the philosophy of peaceful coexistence of states with differing sociopolitical systems.

The general continued his theme:

--"... we intend to achieve strategic goals by peaceful means, in rivalry between systems. We want to develop normal political, diplomatic and economic relations, as the crucial task of foreign policy..."

I list the following points: --the establishment of lasting peace in Europe and in the world; --the prevention of nuclear war; --a halt to the arms race.

Poland occupies a special place in these historical processes. Our guest reminded us that in recent years Poland proved that it knows how to prevent a national catastrophe and the destabilization of the Warsaw Pact.

Poland's credibility as a state is growing.

Our strength is multiplied many times by the power of the USSR and the support of our partner-states.

General Sliwinski discussed these two subjects in some detail. And he said that until a reliable system of security in Europe is established or other political solutions are found which would guarantee the security of the Warsaw Pact, Poland, and other countries, maintenance of the armed forces of the Warsaw Pact countries at a suitable level will make the possibility of an

armed confrontation of the antagonist blocs less likely. He said also that all of our initiatives aimed at preventing war and ensuring peace in the military sphere lie within a framework in which the lower boundary is total and universal disarmament under strict international control and the upper boundary is a ban on construction of new weapons, especially the annihilating, geophysical, binary, cosmic, modernized nuclear weapons...

We were able to hear something about these types of weapons. And at that moment everyone of us realized the importance of negotiations. A dialogue for the sake of dialogue would not be in order here. Approximately 170 initiatives from our bloc of countries have been submitted to the United Nations and at other international forums. That is the appeal of the moment.

"... we must not be pessimists, for then we do nothing and just wait to see what happens. And we cannot wait idly. We must act politically and legally to stop the threat..." That was the final statement in the general's speech, the paper mentioned earlier, and about the fact that someday a solution will come which will bring world security. It is true that this is a long-range process. Nevertheless, we can say today that it has begun: we have an atom-free zone in the Antarctic. There are also plans concerning Africa, Europe...

If only no one presses the well-known--but so important in the fate of the world, the fate of millions of people--"button!"

Comments of Colonel Wozniecki

Warsaw ZOLNIERZ POLSKI in Polish No 10, 4 Mar 84 pp 5, 14

[Interview with Col Bernard Wozniecki, representative of the General Staff of the Polish People's Army, by Tadeusz Oziemkowski: "No Changes in the West"; date and place not specified]

[Text] [Question] Tadeusz Oziemkowski: It is generally being said today that the world faces new threats, both throughout the world and Europe. Could you give us more details about this threat?

[Answer] Colonel Wozniecki: At the basis of the rapidly growing threat lies the main strategic goal of the military policy of the NATO countries, especially the United States, a policy which has been planned to at least the year 2000. Its purpose is to bring about a basic change in the ratio of forces in favor of the capitalist countries, through obtainment of complete military superiority over the Warsaw Pact countries.

Recent years as well as the present represent a period of changes in American and NATO policy, changes that are dangerous for world peace. This has been demonstrated in the departure from detente to an intensification of the international situation, to a policy from a position of strength on a new and more dangerous level of a supermodern military potential. This is a period during which the backward, reactionary forces of the capitalist world have moved to an uncamouflaged, frontal, multifarious struggle with the countries of the socialist community--with communism. In keeping with this

policy is the arming, on an unprecedented scale, and the testing of strength in ever-newer regions of the world--which can easily spread to other areas and spark a new world war.

[Question] After the Soviet-American talks in Geneva broke off, the USSR Government categorically announced that it is ready at any time to resume the talks, but on condition that the United States remove the already-installed missile-launchers and stop the deployment of new missiles. However, the United States is ready to resume the talks, but only from the position of accomplished facts, from the position of strength. What, in your opinion, is the solution here?

[Answer] The existing situation is very difficult and complex. The platform for constructive dialogue and reasonable disarmament agreements was rejected by the leaders of the NATO countries. But the Soviet Union left the door open for resumption of dialogue, on condition, of course, that NATO stop adding to the nuclear stockpile. If this is not done, only one road will remain open to equalize the nuclear balance and thus halt the enemy's aspirations.

This is a difficult and costly road, but it is necessary. Possibly then the American administration will understand that the achievement of nuclear superiority over the USSR and victory in a nuclear war are not possible and negotiations will be resumed. But then these negotiations will be totally different, under conditions of a incomparably higher level of nuclear arms and military threat.

But I would like to call attention to one aspect which makes us optimistic. That is the condemnation, by a large majority of the Western societies, of the American policy of deploying new nuclear weapons in Western Europe. True, this is not bringing about any radical results, particularly since these anti-nuclear movements are being strongly opposed by the governments of the NATO countries, but possibly if this continues, or gathers momentum, it may finally convince the rabid enemies of communism and the advocates of the position-from-strength policy to pause and consider the fate of their own countries should there be a nuclear war, and the advisability of preferring negotiation over the increasingly more dangerous armaments.

[Question] It is a fact that the reason for the present, sudden growth in tensions between the East and the West is the attempt of the United States to gain superiority in medium-range nuclear weapons. Would you please give us a comparison of these missile strengths.

[Answer] The total number of medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe on both sides (as of December 1983) is as follows [see table on following page].

This comparison shows that there is an approximate balance of strength in Europe--almost 1:1 in means of delivery, and that NATO has superiority, 1.4:1, in nuclear-warhead delivering capability.

If the United States were to deploy 572 new missiles in Western Europe, without a corresponding amount deployed by the USSR, this balance would shift in favor of NATO, in the form of a 1.5:1 ratio in delivery means and an even larger ratio in nuclear warheads.

Table 1. Comparison of NATO and USSR Medium-Range Missiles in Europe

<u>NATO</u>		<u>USSR</u>
<u>Land-based missiles:</u>		
French S-3	18	455 SS-4 and SS-20
<u>Submarine-launched missiles:</u>		
On French submarines	80	18
On British submarines	64	
<u>Aircraft-delivered nuclear weapons</u>		
American	651	465
(FB-111 - 65		
F-111 - 172		
F-4 - 174		
A-6, A-7 - 240)		
French Mirage IV	44	
<u>Total</u>		
	857	938
<u>Total nuclear-weapons delivery capability by these means:</u>		
	3,056	2,153

We know about Reagan's "zero-option" proposal--not to deploy "Pershing" and "Cruise" missiles in exchange for the destruction of all medium-range Soviet missiles--by which the United States would change the strength ratio even more in favor of NATO, i.e., to 1.8:1.

When the USSR rejected this proposal, the Americans proposed two other variants, which consisted of a partial reduction of the number of newly deployed missiles in exchange for a very large reduction in existing Soviet missiles. But again, in both cases, the final ratios of strengths would greatly favor NATO.

Obviously such proposals were unacceptable.

The USSR, on its part, submitted three proposals, which require that NATO stop the additional deployment of missiles and that the Soviet Union give up part of their already existing missiles. These proposals would give a ratio of strength ranging from 1:1 to 1.4:1 in favor of NATO.

But this was not enough for the Reagan administration. It wants to gain decided superiority. And that is why it rejects all Soviet proposals.

[Question] Why is the United States so insistent that the weapons which France and Great Britain have not be included in the total amounts which make up the nuclear strength of the NATO countries?

[Answer] The Americans know very well that inclusion of the French and British strengths will deprive their thesis about Soviet nuclear superiority in Europe of any kind of sense, even in the eyes of the Western people.

In maintaining that British and French forces are national forces and not NATO forces, and in not including them in the total figures, a false picture of Soviet superiority is shown, and this is their way of justifying the "equalization" through the deployment of "Pershing 2" and "Cruise" missiles.

And yet Great Britain and France are NATO members, and in case of war their forces and means are forecast and planned in advance for use against the Warsaw Pact countries. The effects of nuclear strikes using American, British and French ballistic and guided missiles, aircraft and ships, would be for us the same. And thus, closing our eyes to their existence would be, on our part, tantamount to a suicidal surrender.

[Question] In the light of the existing situation, can it be concluded that the American politicians and militarists who are deploying missiles in Western Europe believe that they can provoke a conflict with the socialist community, limiting it to Europe, and avoid, at the expense of their allies, spreading the war to United States territory?

[Answer] In deploying new missiles in Europe, the Reagan administration really believes that this will enable them to conduct a limited nuclear war.

This is a naive assumption, which even American strategists do not believe in. It could only arise in the minds of people who do not understand the realities of the international situation.

There is no international convention, no international treaty of any kind which would guarantee that a nuclear conflict could be held within any planned-in-advance boundaries. Can we imagine a situation in which the Americans would destroy Soviet territory using their own missiles deployed in Europe and the Soviets would limit their retaliatory action towards Europe?

[Question] Can a nuclear conflict be won? If so, at what cost?

[Answer] Many experts throughout the world have expressed themselves on this subject. With the exception of those blinded by their own nuclear potential, the most intransigent American politicians and strategists, no logically thinking person who understands the realities of nuclear war believes in such a possibility. Likewise, a calculation of the "costs" of such an imagined victory is absurd, although in practice it is being done. Estimates vary so greatly that it would be hard to accept any one of them as being even approximately credible--they range from several to several hundred million people. Even the ratio of dead soldiers to civilians has been calculated. Although there were 20 dead soldiers to one civilian in the First World War, the ratio during the Second World War had reached a 1:1 ratio. In the Korean War, the ratio was 1 soldier to 5 civilians, and in Viet Nam, 1 soldier to 20 civilians.

These, of course, are theoretical calculations of the "costs" of victory in a nuclear war. In actuality, war will be a world catastrophe and most likely the end of the existence of mankind. And that is precisely why everything possible must be done to prevent it.

[Question] Is it possible in a war today to make a mass surprise nuclear-missile attack without a counterattack by the enemy, or at least restrict it to a certain agreed-upon minimum?

[Answer] The arsenals of nuclear-strike weapons and early detection and warning systems against nuclear attacks are so powerful today, so extensive, that a surprise attack with no retaliatory strike is practically impossible. The Americans know this very well and that is why they are so intransigent in their attempts to deploy their "Pershing 2" missiles in Western Europe. These missiles have a range of 2,500 kilometers and a very short flight-to-target time--5 to 14 minutes. Using them it is possible to making lightning strikes at the most important civilian and military targets in the Warsaw Pact countries, including part of the Soviet strategic nuclear potential. "Lightning" means several times faster and more accurately than could be done using strategic missiles launched from the United States. And that is exactly what--in the opinion of the Reagan administration--should make it impossible for the Soviet Union to counterstrike. But this is a delusive assumption, which fits into the category of "wishful thinking."

[Question] How much has the immediate threat to our country increased since the escalation of nuclear arms by the NATO countries? Is diplomacy, through which, in any case, we have many times manifested many valuable peaceful initiatives, the only weapon that our country has in this matter?

[Answer] Every growth of threat in Europe, including that which is the result of the present attempt to disturb the nuclear balance, is a growth of immediate threat to our country. It would be naive to believe that strategic or euro-strategic missiles aimed at targets in the Soviet Union would simply fly over Poland. After all, we are an inseparable, significant from every standpoint, part of a large community of socialist states, joined politically and defensively by the Warsaw Pact. We do not have either strategic or eurostrategic nuclear weapons, but thanks to the military and economic power of the USSR and other Warsaw Pact countries our defense capability has increased many times over.

Poland is conducting a diplomatic and political struggle against confrontation, for detente, for collective security, for disarmament, with due regard for the principles of balance and equal security. It is against a policy from a position of strength and is for military balance at the lowest possible level.

We believe that every policy which prevents war is a hundred times better than a policy which increases the likelihood of a military victory.

9295

CSO: 2600/1013

PROPOSALS CONTRARY TO DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIALIST LAW

Warsaw TU I TERAZ in Polish No 18, 2 May 84 p 4

[Article by Andrzej Murzynowski: "My Voice in Consultation"; passages enclosed in slantlines printed in boldface]

[Text] /In RZECZPOSPOLITA No 75 there appeared a PAP [Polish Press Agency] **communique** presenting the draft law on augmenting criminal responsibility during the period of overcoming the socioeconomic crisis, and announcing the submission of the draft for social consultation. Having acquainted myself with the draft, I want to take part in this consultation by publishing my view in one of the popular weeklies. I feel it is my duty to do so as a citizen with an active interest in the problems of development and as a person who for over 30 years has been involved in the science of criminal process and who is also familiar with court practice./

I realize that the goal of the authors of the draft is to curb various forms of delinquency which have intensified during the period of the current crisis and threaten the **common** and private property of our country and its citizens. This goal is important for me too and I am in solidarity with the need to realize it. The point is, however, that it should be pursued by means of rational and effective actions.

The authors of the draft want to achieve this goal by considerably augmenting criminal sanction with regard to a broad inventory of offences, particularly against social and private property and against health, committed under the influence of alcohol, bribery and various forms of speculation.

The augmentation of criminal sanction is to consist above all in total inadmissibility of allowing a conditional suspension of a sentence; it is to be allowed only with regard to crimes against property and only in exceptional cases--when the damage inflicted by the crime has been fully compensated. Besides, the draft foresees a considerable curtailment of the possibilities for a special **commutation** of the sentence with regard to some crimes against property and statutory rape, and the use of a conditional early release of recidivists. On the other hand, the tightening of the rigors of criminal procedure is to consist above all in the introduction of an obligatory temporary arrest with regard to the above-mentioned offences.

Additionally, the draft foresees a considerable expansion of the possibilities for using an accelerated procedure (with regard to a number of crimes against property, speculation crimes, crimes against health, against public order and offences threatened with deprivation of freedom of up to 2 years, and for a simplified procedure). It also introduces the possibility of imposing every fine (as a penalty in itself) and the penalty of the limitation of freedom in command procedure, i.e., without a court trial.

/All of these proposals evoke basic reservations. We already have a rigorous penal code which allows the imposition of heavy penalties for offences committed (including those which come within the project of the new law) and which imposes considerable limitations on the possibilities for both a conditional suspension of a sentence and a conditional early release. The rigorous character of our legislation and the practice developed on its basis result in the number of people deprived of freedom in Poland continuing to be very high and rising, after some decline in the past few years. It is higher than the number of prisoners in pre-war Poland and exceeds many times the coefficients of the number of people deprived of freedom in many other countries./

Despite many years of a very severe policy of punishment, its social effects are poor because we have not achieved any major results in curbing delinquency, including the phenomenon of recidivists. This is justly pointed out by T. Kucharski in an interesting and useful article titled "Severity for All." (TiT No 12). It is so because placing many criminals in penal institutions which are overcrowded and often provide very primitive living conditions does not promote the rehabilitation of prisoners. On the contrary, in such penal institutions a specific criminal society forms itself, whose consciousness, customs and some informal structures and associations are later carried over into the human environment outside those institutions.

I realize that we cannot resign from the penalty of the deprivation of freedom, particularly in the case of isolating for a certain period of time criminals dangerous to society. However, the number of people spending time in penal institutions ought to undergo a steady and real decline and the period of their deprivation of freedom ought to be greatly reduced. Only under such circumstances can we assure proper conditions of confinement and education for the people incarcerated and achieve real results in their social rehabilitation, which is in the interest of the whole of society.

By trying to eliminate or extensively curb the use of the conditional suspension in carrying out the sentence and of early release, /the authors of the draft as a matter of fact fall back on outdated nineteenth century conceptions/ of seeking in a sentence of the deprivation of freedom the element of reprisal and deterrence. They move away from the contemporary ideas, developing also in socialist countries, of an individualization and rationalization of punishment. In their rigorous proposals they go so far that they want to eliminate a conditional suspension of a sentence even for offences threatened with incarceration of more than 6 months. By this they limit the freedom of adjudication of the courts, which--with the possibility of a conditional suspension of a sentence--can better adjust the verdict to the concrete con-

ditions of a case which frequently speak against an unconditional deprivation of freedom of a not yet demoralized perpetrator.

Although the draft foresees the exceptional possibility of a conditional suspension of a sentence with regard to crimes against property, it makes it dependent on earlier compensation of damages caused by the offence. This solution was already available from the law of 18 June 1959 regarding criminal responsibility for crimes against social property. It was, however, eliminated from our legislation with the introduction of the current criminal code (under the influence of the postulates of the doctrine, among other things), as clearly contradictory to the principle of the assumption of innocence. The demand that the damage caused by the offence be compensated before the legal verdict is pronounced in an ongoing trial prejudices, in fact, a verdict disadvantageous for the accused and in a way forces his admission of guilt.

Another problem which must generate basic objections concerns the intention of introducing the obligation to use temporary arrest. Obligatory arrest was introduced in the code of criminal procedure in 1949 and eliminated in 1955 with the liquidation of some undemocratic changes made in the criminal procedure during the period of distortions. It was justly recognized as an institution contrary to the judicial goal of that preventive measure. It was also contrary to the principle of the assumption of innocence which requires that the accused be treated as innocent and against whom in the course of the criminal trial no repressive measures can be used. On the other hand, it is persecution to use temporary arrest only because a given person is accused of committing a certain offence for which act, moreover, that person is frequently threatened with a deprivation of freedom of 6 months at a minimum.

Moreover, the obligatory temporary arrest introduces an undesirable tendency toward automatically using this measure. This automatic use is incompatible with the regulations of the criminal procedure code which treats temporary arrest as a final measure among the totality of preventive measures. It is also contrary to art 9, par 3 of the International Agreement on Civil and Political Rights, ratified by Poland, which states that temporary arrest cannot be a rule in criminal procedure, but can only be used for certain judicial goals. Finally, it is also contrary to the need to respect the inner convictions of the judicial organs (the court and the prosecution), which ought to be guaranteed a broad freedom in undertaking the decision of the need to deprive the accused of his freedom. Moreover, the introduction of obligatory temporary arrest will undoubtedly bring a considerable increase in the number of persons preventively deprived of freedom whose guilt may, as the result of a trial, not be confirmed (an excessive use of this drastic measure of depriving freedom is already an ascertained fact).

A significant danger to following the proper procedure in criminal trials lurks in the proposal for a considerable expansion of the possibilities of accelerating and simplifying criminal procedure. Particularly objectionable is the possibility of inflicting punishment on the accused of up to 3 years of incarceration and up to half a million of zlotys in fine, in an accelerated procedure. In the conditions of accelerated procedure, a large number of the

basic principles of the criminal trial which are to guarantee the correctness of the verdict, are greatly reduced. In this procedure, the principle of the representatives of society participating in the adjudication of criminal trials does not function, because one-person judge pronounces the verdict. The right to defence also is extensively limited because the accused has actually no possibility of preparing for defence, choosing an appropriate lawyer and agreeing with him on the line of conduct at the main trial (as all this requires some time which is lacking in the procedure under discussion). The accelerated criminal procedure is also not conducive to the realization of the principle of the individualization of criminal sanction. In the short time limits set for the criminal procedure it is not possible to collect the exhaustive data concerning the defendant discussed in art 8 of the criminal procedure code. Defects of this type of procedure--about which, among others, Andrzej Gaberle wrote exhaustively and correctly in the work "Accelerated Procedure in the Polish Criminal Process (Against the Background of the Requirements of the Law and Studies of the Practice)," make for frequent critical evaluations of the accelerated procedure in the current legislature.

/Proposals aimed at accelerating and simplifying the procedure at the cost of limiting the process guarantees in our criminal procedure are contrary to the general trend of development of socialist law, which tends in the opposite direction--toward strengthening the protection of the rights of the individual in the criminal process,/ particularly the right of the accused to defence, and greater uniformity of the procedural forms for all legal issues. One can learn about these trends and others occurring in socialist countries from the collective monograph published at the end of 1983 by the USSR Academy of Sciences, entitled "The Right of the Accused to Defence in the Socialist Criminal Process."* /For all these reasons, I am against the implementation of the law draft under discussion. It is a draft incompatible with the basic assumptions of socialist legislation./ The proposed changes are unnecessary for more effectively combating certain kinds of crimes particularly vexatious for society in the period of the crisis. The material criminal law gives the courts sufficient possibilities for punishing crimes of great danger to society with appropriate severity; not in a mechanical way, however, but by taking into consideration all the individual subjective and objective circumstances of each case. The code of the criminal procedure, on the other hand, creates sufficient possibilities for carrying out criminal procedure at the appropriate pace and to allow broad (too broad, in view of the doctrine) possibilities for using temporary arrest with regard to all kinds of crime.

In order to combat more effectively certain types of crimes against social and private property and against the health and safety of citizens, we must simply carry out the regulations of the current law better and increase the solving

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One of the authors of the monograph is Prof Dr Andrzej Murzynowski, the author of this article.

of crimes and the effectiveness of their prosecution--all in the conditions of respect for the guarantees of the trial, assuring a law-abiding and just character of court verdicts. For this purpose we need a greater efficiency and regularity of action of the organs of prosecution and jurisdiction, as well as broad support on the part of society in combating crime which is particularly vexatious for it. Success in the fight against many offenses also depends, after all, on notifying the organs of prosecution of the facts and their occurrence, and on the willingness of witnesses to provide true testimony. This is possible to achieve in cases of offences which meet with general moral condemnation, particularly acts consisting on the use of brutal violence, under the condition, however, that the persons who report the crime, and witnesses, are assured proper protection against acts of revenge by criminal groups.

Precisely such methods of calm but consistent and rational activity can provide the possibility for achieving positive results in combating crime. /On the other hand, the issuing of criminal laws which increase the rigor of the adjudicated punishment and which make more rigorous the forms of criminal procedure will constitute a sham activity of little efficiency, which moreover will turn in an undesirable direction our whole system of criminal law./

By applying a critical attitude to the draft law on increasing criminal responsibility, I also bear in mind that the doctrine of criminal law postulates the development of our legal system in an altogether different direction--in the direction of its democratization and humanization. Such direction of legislative change was defined in the drafts of amendments published in 1981, which are awaiting discussion and realization. Apart from various doubts and objections which these projects may generate, I am of the opinion that the process of the renewal of our system of justice, necessary also with regard to criminal law, ought to go in this direction. Due to our country's difficult situation we can wait somewhat with the realization of the legislative changes postulated by the science and by large groups of lawyers. We should not, however, now undertake actions of a contrary character, even if they are to serve temporary immediate goals.

12270

CSO: 2600/991

ACTIVITIES OF NATIONAL CULTURE COUNCIL QUESTIONED

Warsaw KIERUNKI in Polish No 18, 29 Apr 84 pp 1,5

[Article by Zbigniew Czajkowski: "What Has Happened With the 'Report on the State of Culture'?"]

[Text] Among the statutory tasks of the National Council of Culture there is a demand that "at least once a year the council should publish a synthesis of information, opinions and evaluations of the situation in Polish culture." It is customary to call such tripartite material, containing information, opinions, and solutions to problems, a "report," in this case "a report on the state of culture." At least this is the way in which the secretariat of the National Council of Culture has referred to it in the materials and comments that had been sent to council's members; the meetings and debates in the council itself have also employed this term.

"Report" is a fashionable term with several meanings. It imposes an obligation on its authors to examine the subject matter thoroughly it is also a term that has been banalized by the inflation of various "reports," of which only some meet adequate criteria. The term has undergone its own vicissitudes, ups and downs. Let us only recall the fate of the famous "Report on the State of Education," written more than 10 years ago by a large group of prominent experts; even today it can be read with unflagging interest and attention. The "Report on the State of Education" had a concrete purpose, it was a scientific and methodological "introduction" to, and "preparation" for a reform of the educational system. Unfortunately, "the order of things" evolved in an entirely different direction because people who were responsible for the last 10 years have probably never even scanned the report's instructive materials and conclusions.

Bad experiences should not preclude the renewal of correct efforts by those who believe that various "reports" play a socially needed service role. In this case a label is of secondary importance, although it may suggest content which is not always attainable by the authors or intended by the sponsors, that is, by the government, the state authorities. One should not forget that the National Council of Culture is a social body functioning under the auspices of the prime minister, a body whose task is merely to inform, formulate opinions, and make suggestions. Some inspirations may follow from such suggestions, but moving them into the implementation stage already belongs to other subjects because the council has no executive authority. In this situation the word "may" acquires the proper content and proportion.

The council may and should focus attention on the fundamental directions of development of national culture and the implementation of cultural policies, uncover irregularities and deformations, suggest what should be done, what should be fixed, what should be developed, and what should be encouraged. However, it has no appropriate authority or means to implement such suggestions.

The sponsor, the people's government, may but does not have to listen to these suggestions or advice. Such is the law and custom defining the relationship between a sponsor and its advisory bodies. An important conclusion follows from this, namely that there must be a proper relationship between the sponsor, i.e., the government and the prime minister, and the council. Such a relationship must rest on the mutual confidence that, on the one hand, the council will address the most important issues and propose solutions freely and without impediments, but at the same time responsibly, in accordance with the rules of the socialist state of the whole nation, and, on the other hand, that the government will listen to the advice, analyze its substance, and try to follow conclusions and recommendations. This subject was addressed by Gen Wojciech Jaruzelski during the inaugurative session of the National Council of Culture on 24 January 1983. He said: "We expect that the Council of Culture will become an authentic co-creator and a convinced advocate of both the idea of socialist cultural policy, and the more effective forms of state sponsorship of culture. There are no ready prescriptions here. We simply must patiently and persistently learn together. (...) We are also counting on the National Council of Culture to become a provident co-manager, to make suggestions to the government regarding the best way of utilizing resources, how to enrich them through social activity and citizens' efforts." This mutual "co-managing" of culture includes something more than ordinary "social advice." It is a method, provided it proves itself in practice, which will enhance principles of democratization of public life, leading to further generalizations and concretizations.

Let us return, however, to the matter of the "Report on the State of Culture." I have doubts whether the "report," in the wider sense of a systematic, detailed description of phenomena and facts, their characterization, manifestation, evaluation, ensuing difficulties and irregularities, and further -- conclusions, i.e. the analytical work encompassing the whole national culture, could emerge from the work of the presently, or rather, heretofore existing and functioning National Council of Culture. Without belittling in any way the social and substantive significance of the entire council and its individual members, many of whom are prominent artists, specialists, and social activists who know this subject in its microscopic and macroscopic dimensions, it is doubtful whether the "Report on the State of Culture," in the broad sense, is feasible.

Generally speaking, the concept of culture is complex and includes measurable and comparable material goods as well as the sphere of nonmaterial culture expressed in the level of education, the use of material goods and cultural products; it is also an appropriate, unmeasurable "substance" of national and civic consciousness. An assessment of this rich realm which defines

our national identity and the national character of the Poles, however debatable, our emotions, reactions and behavior, is still an unrealized task, a subject of controversy and debate, of long "national retreat."

Thus I agree with the moderate optimism or, rather, realism represented by the chairman, Prof Bogdan Suchodolski, with respect to the possibilities of action and the tasks set forth by the Council of Culture.

He said in an interview that "the capacities of the council, like the capacities of any social body, are modest. We can correctly diagnose the situation, point to the needs, perhaps even correctly formulate the directions of action in that situation, but all the rest does not depend on us, it depends on the great army of creators and the even greater army of those who are professionally or through personal interest involved in the popularization and intensification of participation in culture."* I share this view.

If we agree that it is not possible to issue a comprehensive "report" encompassing the whole realm of material and spiritual culture, and cultural policy, then what is possible as well as useful?

A cursory review of problems and needs indicates that there is no area, not even a "sliver" of culture, which would be satisfactory to us. While we deplore the state of the economy, we often fail to realize the seriousness of neglect and social deformations which exist in the realm of culture. In some cases neglect is so serious and significant that it impacts on the totality of sociocultural-political problems. I agree with the oft-stated view that without a significant transformation of attitudes and upbringing in society, not only in humanist and professional education, but also in civic and political culture, in culture in general, one cannot even dream about effective transformations of a socioeconomic nature, about success of economic reform, about change in the attitudes toward work, productivity and dependability in carrying out obligations. Culture -- in the broad meaning of the term -- is, among other things, a keystone and the ultimate cause of further technical, technological and civilizational change. This view, still neither popular nor widespread, is painfully gaining some understanding and trust. The sooner it is accepted by the authorities and assimilated by the society, the shorter the period of reconstruction of our economy, as well as the entire infrastructure of sociopolitical life, will turn out to be.

Since we cannot afford to undertake actions on the "wide front" in this matter, we should concentrate on the few most important, most needed problems which are also capable of being resolved. Which ones? This is the question that ought to be answered by the National Council of Culture. It is the council which, on the basis of various official, social and personal sources of information, should formulate a catalogue of problems which would square the reasons of state cultural policy with the needs of society. It would be a "meeting" that would diverge from the banalities and platitudes characterizing the decisions of administrative organs and the discontent of citizens. It would be based on a realistic analysis of appropriately

*Interview with Professor B. Suchodolski in SLOWO POWSZECHNE 19-21 November 1983.

defined areas, cultural spheres into which Poland is divided; not the provincial, communal, administrative Poland, but the Poland of various socio-cultural realms that differ in the degree of their economic and scientific saturation, cultural and educational infrastructure, opportunities to participate in cultural life. Sociologists of culture could count several, at least four or five, such spheres/areas, which are so radically different in this respect that it is as if they did not together constitute an integral whole, one state and nation.

Let us leave this problem of sociocultural inequities for another occasion. I mentioned it only as an example of a subject for methodological reflection and a choice of a topic to be dealt with now, precisely by means of a "Report on the State of Culture."

In the above-quoted interview, Professor Suchodolski presented a worthy choice of problems which should be presently addressed by the National Council of Culture. Among other things, he said:

"For the immediate future we have set four areas of action which are, in our view, unusually important and urgent. The first concerns the intensification of social movement in culture, the second concerns equalization of the opportunities for access to culture by various geographic and social communities, the third deals with the problems of cultural education of society, and the fourth involves the most intangible question: the inspiration of creativity, the creation of a favorable climate for creative endeavors, conducting a dialogue between artists and their publics."

This choice of problems is, in my view, a very apt one because each one is a significant pillar supporting national culture, and, regrettably, each has been undergoing, for years if not decades, a characteristic crisis.

Without delving further into the nature of this crisis, deformation, or even "decay," which could, and should, become a stimulus for a more analytical and critical treatment, I would like to point out a few important details which support Professor Suchodolski's view.

That which we call social movement in culture has for a long time been in a state of social atrophy. Erroneous cultural policy has caused not insignificant damage in this area of natural social activity. It was overly centralized and uniform, depriving social movement in culture of its life-blood -- independence, initiative, autonomy. A social movement, if it is to retain its identity, authenticity and genuine character, cannot be reduced to the currents and channels subordinated to bureaucracy. If the community initiating it is full of vitality, dynamic, rich in cultural imagination, it can find an expression of its creativity and its presence in culture. If it is poor, no financial or administrative stimuli will be of any help.

By no means do I call for a "laissez-faire" attitude devoid of any program, but I do not agree to overly zealous help by various patrons who attempt to "steer" social initiatives according to their own liking. In reality

they dampen the enthusiasm and the imagination of its authentic creators.

The politicization of the social movement in culture is equally erroneous and damaging. By this I mean the so-called "majorization" and the subjection of culture to politics.

The present situation requires us to undertake many efforts to restore confidence in social action.

The National Council of Culture should examine this problem with great care. In the last few years it has swollen, not with the richness of phenomena and manifestations but with poverty and atrophy.

The next task proposed by Professor Suchodolski has some connection with the previous one. The issue of equalization of opportunities of access to culture is in a sense a function of the weakness of social movement, but it is also -- and this is a difference from the previous issue -- a matter of faults in the cultural policy.

I mentioned above the problem of inequality among the "regions" -- cultural spheres in our country. A solution to this problem requires surmounting several fundamental barriers. Such barriers emerge around big cities, scientific and cultural centers; they are erected by smaller towns which attempt to "defend" their cultural tradition; above all barriers divide the cities and the villages, settlements, and even small towns, where, with the exception of badly functioning movie theater, a weakly led cultural center, and remnants of clubs, ensembles, or social movement, there is often nothing, literally nothing. Artistic folk ensembles presented to the members of the National Council of Culture, such as in Krzycko Wielkie, are like a proverbial speck of precious metal on a sandy bank of culture.

Undoubtedly, they are examples which encourage optimism, showing that it is impossible and necessary to undertake efforts precisely on this "sandbank," efforts that aim to equalize opportunities for participation in culture. Statutes and executive orders in preparation, although they are very much needed and put this neglected area of culture in order, are only a part of the problem. The next, inspirational, methodological and programmatic part remains a fertile field and a task for the National Council of Culture.

Cultural education of society is a river-wide topic, overflowing, meandering, full of shoals and non-navigable. This one topic, if dealt with programmatically, systematically and persistently, would be enough for long years of activity by the National Council of Culture. Time is passing, however; it calls and warns us as citizens and as a society against the threatening danger of further deterioration of culture. This is not a platitude or a banality but a bitter self-accusation, justified by the example of everyday living, of interpersonal relations, their attitudes toward each other as well as toward matters of general nature: the state, the nation, new ideas and watchwords. Cultural education requires deep changes in the ways and methods of rearing the young generation, but not just the young generation. It requires changes in the lifestyle, in the use of language, in attitudes

and behavior. It also requires changes in educational programs, in the policy of directing mass media, above all radio and television. Let me repeat: it is a topic like a river; to tame it, not so much to keep it in check as to use what is best in it, what is useful, what is right, demands not only great imagination and a long-range educational program, but also decisiveness and persistence in its realization.

Finally, the last issue which Professor Suchodolski called, concisely, "the inspiration of creativity," justifying and developing the thought that what matters most is a "creation of a climate conducive to creative efforts and conducting a dialogue between artists and their publics."

With this thematic proposal we enter an extremely important sphere; it is, especially today, a controversial one. A description of what is called a "creative atmosphere" is today a source of passionate arguments. They are not, however, the desired arguments about values, their choice, their intellectual and moral weight; they are political arguments which have little if anything to do with culture. I feel freed of the responsibility of developing this topic by Zygmunt Lichniak's articles published recently in KIERUNKI.* On my part I would only like to add that I appreciate the importance and significance of politics in the creation of culture. But let us not allow ourselves be misled by certain prophets and saviors, as if they were especially "visited" and called upon to say and do only the right things. In order for this not to be the case we need a talk, a dialogue.

The adoption of only these four problems by the National Council of Culture as leading ones for the near future would require serious work and implementation procedures that could satisfy the expectations and hopes connected with the activities of the council. The complex nature of these problems and their complicated matter, as it turns out not always solely cultural, should not deter the National Council of Culture from making such an attempt. If the council is to become what it wanted to become when it was created, it should not shun advice and comments in the most important matters.

* KIERUNKI No 13/14, 1984

WASHINGTON CORRESPONDENT COMMENTS ON PRESIDENTIAL REPORT

Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 8 Jun 84 p 7

[Article by Jerzy Gorski, Washington correspondent for PAP: "A Document of Interference in the Internal Affairs of Poland"]

[Text] The latest report by the President of the United States addressed to the "Commission for Security and Cooperation in Europe" appointed by Congress dealing with the implementation of resolutions contained in the Helsinki Final Act has been published in Washington.

The report covers the period from December 1982 to March 1984 and exclusively concerns itself with the European socialist countries. The authors of the report at this time did not refrain from using evaluation standards which are supposed to justify the right of the United States to formulate its own subjective judgments about the situation and events in Poland and the other socialist countries. Therefore, the latest report of the U.S. President is yet another document of a government which usurps for itself the right to pass judgment and evaluate courses of internal events transpiring in other countries and to use this as a basis for conducting unfriendly policies detrimental to other nations. It is yet another document of intervention in the internal affairs of other countries.

Alongside the stereotypical and often repeated attacks against socialist Poland, the report contained certain more realistic elements. This time it maintained a more tranquil tone than did former reports and to a greater degree than before notes the increasing normalization and improvement of living conditions in Poland. The authors of the report, in their admission that the government of General Jaruzelski is making efforts to return Poland to the status of a normally functioning member of the international community, has brought particular attention to our country's broadening contacts. This was substantiated by the visit to Poland of the head of the Catholic Church, Pope John Paul II and also by the visit of the general secretary of the United Nations. In stating that the Polish Government is attempting to establish international cooperation in economic scientific and educational fields, the report also focuses attention on the fact that the economic circles of the West have had unlimited access to pertinent information dealing with these areas.

In dealing with the problem of finding a solution to the Polish debt, the authors of the report stress that the Polish Government has assumed a positive attitude in relation to Western banks and governments conducting negotiations regarding the guidelines and conditions for the repayment of the debts contracted by Poland. According to the report, the Polish Government is trying to make arrangements abroad for the utilization of Poland's unused industrial production capacities and also to expand its export potential.

The authors of the report further state that in its internal policies the Polish Government is strongly promoting the enforcement of law and order, at the same time attempting to broaden democratic principles and establish "national unity." In noting that General Jaruzelski's government is maintaining a policy of dialogue at all social levels and with institutions representing various social segments, the authors of the report point out the deliberations which are being conducted between the government and representatives of the Catholic Church in Poland, despite existing controversies. The report voices the opinion that in many instances the policies of the Polish Government are not understood by certain groups of society.

In speaking of the trade union movement in Poland, the report emphasizes the difficulties confronting it by the actions of some of the social groups and also points out that today's trade unions show much greater activity than did union movements which existed prior to 1980. The report also admits that the Polish press is a forum of enlivened debate on matters of national interest. The methods of mass media in Poland present many and often contradictory views on the subjects of attaining economic reform, ideology and personnel policies.

The Polish press with complete freedom discusses family, housing, educational, health service and a variety of problems connected with hardships facing the younger generation. Well-known journalists and publicists participate in polemics and debates on national and international subjects.

Discussing the working conditions of foreign correspondents, the report confirms that the representatives of the mass media of the Western countries have unlimited freedom of movement within the whole territory of Poland and seldom encounter any difficulties in obtaining information.

12306
CSO: 2600/1025

ARMY MILITARY SCHOOL CHIEF DISCUSSES PROBLEMS, ATTITUDES

Kielce SLOWO LUDU in Polish 7 Mar 84 p 4

[Interview with Col Zygmunt Kwiatkowski, head of the Department of Military Schools and Academies of the Main Political Board of the Polish Army, by Jacek Strzemzalski of INTERPRESS]

[Question] The average reader is not adequately informed on all aspects of education at the military academies. Do they differ from those of the general civilian higher schools of learning?

[Answer] Yes and no. We conduct recruitments each year, but these in a way are targeted types of recruitment. The choice of a military profession is most often basically a choice of a lifetime career. We therefore have to apprise the young people of the complicated and difficult problems inherent in the modern army, familiarize them with the contemporary life style and acquaint the aspirant with the responsibilities associated with today's military service. The selectivity mentioned is intended to provide the right kind of candidates. It is understandable that not everyone can serve in a given branch of service.

[Question] Does this then mean that future officers of the LWP [Polish People's Army] are not too well oriented in the characteristics of military science?

[Answer] This does happen. The military profession is not generally understood. The carrying out of military activities obviously is conducted in a rather hermetic set of operating conditions. By this I mean life in the barracks or on the firing range. The average person only knows about this life from articles he may read or through anecdotes which do not in all cases give a true account of contemporary army life.

[Question] How does this affect the general understanding of candidates applying to the military schools?

[Answer] We must admit that the military profession as well as the desire to attend the military academies has been received with considerable interest by the young people.

[Question] Can we talk about the candidates' disillusionment after finding out the facts about studies at military schools?

[Answer] This would be an exaggeration. Still it is a fact that the military profession is reflected in the minds of the young people by a series of myths. These are myths which have been created within the family circle and related by friends. In most cases they consist of a variety of stories, in some cases even very romantic ones. Because of this the young man has an imaginary picture of the army imprinted in his mind on the one hand, and on the other a false picture of the armed forces formed in reality on the strength of legends.

[Question] In the consciousness of every Pole, especially of those who have just received their certificate of maturity [high school diploma], the army brings to mind the responsibilities brought on by the grave historic periods of the past.

[Answer] Yes. Normally the Poles have the concept of the army as being fashioned for one-time undertakings. An army stands for war. It is a fighting entity. It becomes a little harder to understand the role of the army in times of peace. Often the availability of the army for the preservation of peaceful social existence is not fully appreciated. Service in the Polish army is basically an arduous activity. At times the young man reasons: if there were a war we could understand the necessity of a draft, but since there is no threat, military service, particularly on the professional level, seems to be totally pointless. This evidently results from the lack of understanding of what is meant by a general threatening situation in the modern world. We should also consider the somewhat biased circumstances existing for the teaching and preservation of peace.

[Question] Among Polish youth a tendency to aim for an early establishment of life goals is evident. This has created a noticeable decline in enrollment at polytechnic institutes. How does this situation present itself with regard to the military schools?

[Answer] We have also noticed this phenomenon. However, in the case of military schools it has a rather different character than at the civilian schools. The young people are living a faster life, so they want to achieve independence sooner. Not always does an acceleration in the legal maturing process go hand in hand with the achievement of social maturity, however. Often motivations of the so-called lower variety come into play at this point. A particular trend comes to mind, one which strives for early self-reliance, good wages and a so-called "position in life." In addition to this, the prevailing circumstances are such that professions which do not require high qualifications offer relatively high remuneration.

All of this causes a certain deterioration of loftier ambition. The crux of the matter is cultural and intellectual development, meaning, an improvement in the levels of attainment achieved by Poles up to this time, with consideration given to planning for the future. It is obvious that all of us are striving for the creation of better living conditions for our future

generations. We are accomplishing this in the field of material improvements to the best of our abilities. We have not always been able to gain what could be considered a firm foundation suitable for the promotion of ambitions motivated by family guidance or social environment.

[Question] Did the imposition of martial law have an effect on the attitude of youth toward military service and study?

[Answer] The imposition of martial law has left its mark on society's awareness. There is no denying that it has left an enormous impression on the basic social foundations in many different respects. For one thing, the military demonstrated a high degree of efficiency in protecting the interests of the public. The military protected the nation, a nation that retained its functioning. Peace was maintained, with only minimal losses. The military educational system revealed its new image through the actions of the participating military academy cadets, who fulfilled their assignments related to the military law. By this I mean their willingness to endure sacrifices. The initial words of the beautiful "Blessed Love of Our Dear Homeland" found their affirmation in our daily lives, this was their verification. In other instances, however, martial law aroused many fears and apprehensions among the young people. This did not come about spontaneously but was orchestrated by our political adversaries. The personnel of the higher military academies should eliminate these impressions (as they constantly try to do), through discussions with the young people.

[Question] Military service is an honor. How would you define education in the modern army?

[Answer] The students of the military academies are made aware of the fact that today's army is essentially a highly technical science. With the colossal technical advancements of the modern world, the army is constantly upgraded and is not even a step behind today's technical progress. We should be concerned with the high level of specialization and not solely about adequate preparedness. The truth of the matter is that the romance of the military uniform has acquired new qualities and changes which have gone in the direction of providing the highest possible level of education and scientific preparedness for our future officers. Such is the responsibility of our students and their teachers.

12306

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EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR BLASTS ON AIR DEFENSE COMMUNICATIONS

Poznan-Warsaw PRZEGLAD WOJSK LOTNICZYCH I WOJSK OBRONY POWIETRZNEJ KRAJU
in Polish No 5, May 84 pp 39-41

[Article by Capt Tadeusz Smigielski: "Protecting Operations; The Effects of Nuclear Blasts on the Communications Systems of the Home Air Defense Forces"]

[Text] A communications system consists of communication lines, stations and junctions that are interconnected to satisfy the needs of military operations and the organization of military commands, and to fulfill military tasks. In performing its tasks, the reliability of WOPK's [National Air Defense Forces] communications system is very important. Because of the nature of these tasks, WOPK's communications system is a stationery system which is especially vulnerable to nuclear blasts.

The shock wave, thermal radiation, hard radiation, electromagnetic pulse (EMP) and seismic wave generated by nuclear blasts have negative effects on the reliability of communications systems. These effects should be examined in three aspects: the effects on personnel operating communications equipment, the effects on communications equipment, and the effects on radiowave propagation.

The Effects on Personnel Operating Communications Equipment

During ground and air nuclear blasts, the shock wave, thermal radiation, hard radiation and seismic wave are especially hazardous to communications equipment. The heat wave blast and thermal radiation constitute 80 to 90 percent of a nuclear blast's energy. A 1-mT nuclear blast generates an overpressure of about 0.42 kg/cm² within a 5.7-km radius that causes serious damage to reinforced concrete structures. Radio station antenna masts and radio link antennas will be destroyed even at a lesser overpressure. About 30 to 40 percent of a nuclear blast's energy is contained in the thermal radiation which causes fires and burns and can mechanically weaken earth structures. Hard radiation permanently damages semiconductor components. Gamma radiation generates false current pulses in semiconductors, permanently changing the polarization voltages of transistors. Electron streams can alter the crystal lattice of semiconductor material, and a large flow of neutrons can permanently alter the operating characteristics

Table 1. Effects of hard radiation on people

(1)		
Wielkość napromie- niowania (radów)	Natychmiastowe (2) objawy	Efekt (3) długofalowy
100	Nie występują (4)	Wzrost zacho- rowań na bia- łączkę (5)
150	Mdłości (6)	50% ludzi na- promieniowa- nych umiera w ciągu 60 dni (7)
450	Mdłości i bie- gunki (8)	50% ludzi na- promieniowa- nych umiera (7) w ciągu 60 dni
1000	Ostre wymioty biegunki (9)	100% ludzi na- promieniowa- nych umiera w ciągu 5 dni (10)
3000	Ostre wymioty, biegunki, pora- żenia centralne- go systemu ner- wowego i ukła- du krążenia (11)	100% ludzi na- promieniowa- nych umiera w ciągu 30 min (12)

Key:

1. Amount of irradiation (in rads)
2. Immediate symptoms
3. Long-term effects
4. None
5. Increase incidences of leukemia
6. Nausea
7. Fifty percent of the people irradiated die within 60 days
8. Nausea and diarrhea
9. Severe vomiting, diarrhea
10. One hundred percent of the people irradiated die within 5 days
11. Severe vomiting, diarrhea; paralysis of central nervous system and circulation system
12. One hundred percent of the people irradiated die within 30 minutes

of a semiconductor component or damage it such that the entire subassembly becomes inoperative. A seismic wave, which is generated when a nuclear blast impacts the earth's surface, manifests itself as sharp loads that damage telephone and feeder cables installed underground and in bunkers and ground structures.

As the altitude of an air nuclear blast increases, the described effects on the operations of a communications system diminish, but the significance of the EMP, which arises as a result of gamma radiation, increases. The EMP appears in two zones. For low-altitude blasts, zone 1 is limited to the source region in which the gamma radiation dissipates its energy; zone 2 is the region in which an electromagnetic field is generated that propagates as a plane wave. In zone 1 (3 to 6km) the EMP achieves an intensity of hundreds of thousands of V/m [volts per meter]. Communication equipment located in zone 2, outside the thermal and hard radiation wave blast region, will be exposed to an electromagnetic field of 15,000 to 20,000 V/m. For high-altitude blasts, gamma radiation dissipates its energy in the lower sphere of the ionosphere's D layer. An electromagnetic field is generated in the region beneath the energy dissipation area; this field, which is in the form of a plane wave directed toward the earth, has an intensity of 50,000 V/m.

An EMP permanently damages radio station antenna circuits, destroys communication wire installations and penetrates the unshielded walls of bunkers and hiding-places, affecting the electromagnetic apparatus within them.

The Effects of Nuclear Blasts on Propagation of Radiowaves

In addition to its effects on people and communications equipment, a nuclear blast also changes the atmosphere's electromagnetic characteristics that degrade radiowave propagation. The radiowave propagation abnormalities are closely related to the altitude at which the nuclear blast occurs. At low altitudes, all frequencies will be suppressed in the fire ball caused by the blast. But at high altitudes, two factors affect radiowaves. First, the fire ball has a much greater radius than a low-level explosion. Second, the ionization of the air increases rapidly (see Table 2).

For the WOPK, the effectiveness and reliability of a communications system are of primary importance. Thus, the cooperation at many levels of communication of users and organizers is required and, when designing equipment, the use of modern technology is required to make the equipment immune to the effects of nuclear blasts.

Table 2. Effects of ionization on radiowave propagation

Częstotliwość (1)	Rodzaj fali (2)	Wpływ jonizacji na propagację fal radiowych (3)
1	2	3
Fale długie 0,3—3 MHz (4)	Przyziemna (5)	Krótkotrwały, bezpośrednio po wybuchu (kilka minut). Po tym czasie zasięg może się zwiększyć dwu- krotnie w wyni- ku ekranizacji ziemi. (7)
	Przestrzenna (6)	Podobny, w za- kresie od 1 do 3 MHz. (8)
Fale krótkie 3—30 MHz (9)	Przyziemna (5)	Brak wpływu z wyjątkiem wybuchów na drodę rozprze- strzeniania się fal. (11)
	Przestrzenna (6)	W odległości od wybuchu do 16 km nie ma prawie żadnego wpływu powy- żej 16 km zasięg zmniejsza się do zaniknięcia. (12)
Fale UKF 30—300 MHz (10)		Brak wpływu, jedynie na dro- dę rozprze- strzeniania się fal chwilowy zanik łączności. (13)

Key:

1. Frequency range
2. Type of wave
3. Effect of ionization on radiowave propagation
4. Low frequency
5. Ground wave
6. Space wave
7. Short-term, directly after the blast (a couple of minutes). Then, the range can double because the earth is shielded.
8. Similar to the 1 to 3 MHz range
9. High frequencies

[Key continued on following page]

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10. Ultra-high frequencies
11. No effect except for blasts in the path of a propagating wave
12. Up to 16 km from the blast there is practically no effect;
beyond the 16-km range, the effect disappears
13. No effect, except that in the path of a propagating wave there
is a temporary lack of communication

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QUARTERMASTER SCHOOL COMMANDER DISCUSSES CAREER, DUTIES

Warsaw ZOLNIERZ POLSKI in Polish No 20, 13 May 84 pp 5, 10

[Interview with Brig Gen Piotr Przybyszewski, commandant of the Marian Buczek Officers Institute of Quartermaster Services in Poznan, conducted by Tadeusz Oziemkowski for the series "People From the Honor Roll of Soldierly Deeds": "What Our Institute Has Done"]

[Text] [Question] In the year of the 40th anniversary of the Polish People's Army, your name, General, has been entered on the Honor Roll of Soldierly Deeds. Does this not provide a reason for some reflection?

[Answer] Of course it does. In the first place, I was not the only person working for this success. If it had not been for the efforts of my closest colleagues, instruction personnel and even the officer cadets, we would not have had the success we have had with the institute in recent years.

[Question] Do you mean the three medals for "Achievements in Military Service" and a fourth for "Outstanding Accomplishment" presented by the minister of national defense and currently on display in the institute's Hall of Tradition?

[Answer] I am not only referring to these medals. Twice recently the institute was closely inspected by the Inspector of the Armed Forces and twice it was distinguished by the national defense minister in his orders. We were also considerably successful in taking first place in last year's academy and officer institute championships. This athletic achievement is even more impressive because we were victorious over such athletic giants as the Infantry and Armor Institutes.

[Question] Your institute, General, has all the right conditions for conducting all kinds of sports.

[Answer] I won't dispute that. Not every institute of higher education has such a modern and excellently equipped indoor swimming pool. As far as our other facilities are concerned, they are quite average. But we still are talking about encouraging the cadets to make a daily effort and compete athletically. We are also striving to have a large number of equally capable athletes among both our senior and junior cadets. Still, our junior

cadets are far from perfect. Schools generally neglect the athletic prowess of their pupils. The result is that we sometimes have a well-built boy who has a talent for sports and yet cannot move around on the parallel bars.

[Question] Let's get back to the subject of this interview.

[Answer] Of course. I believe that our fundamental objective is the education of the individual, the shaping of positive personal characteristics and the encouragement to work persistently and conscientiously on himself. We train in our quartermaster's school officers who, after their commissioning, will be self-dependent organizers in various military management positions; they will be responsible for millions of zlotys worth of property in our military units. Graduates of our institute will also be first class specialists in providing the rear areas of military activities on the modern battlefield with their services. This is our duty!

[Question] Our forces are saturated with all kinds of modern combat equipment.

[Answer] True. For this reason, we must provide our graduates with an extensive amount of knowledge, not only technical and generally military, but sociopolitical as well. Our officers must be not only accomplished masters in providing food, uniform, financial, fuel and lubricant services or specialists in lodging and construction services. Our graduates have to know not only their selected specialties, they have to be the commanders and trainers of our young soldiers.

[Question] During the institute's Officers Commissioning Ceremony, one could see that the young officers-to-be were wearing different uniforms: those of the ground forces, navy and air force.

[Answer] This is logical; right after commissioning, they will be off to their military services.

[Question] Wasn't there a time when officer commissioning was not so attractive and certainly not done with the candidates wearing such uniforms?

[Answer] There certainly was. Here I'd like to return to what I said at the beginning of this interview. I come from a working family in Zwolenie near Radom. I will long remember the occupation, inasmuch as I was a teenager when it began. At this time, I was working in Hitler's Germany and my brother, Stanislaw, took up arms and joined the ranks of the People's Guards. He was still an active member when the Polish Workers' Party emerged. He ended up in Auschwitz concentration camp, but survived despite all the suffering. When I returned from Germany in October 1945, I began working at the Electro-Machine Works in Walbrzych.

[Question] How was it back then?

[Answer] Both difficult and happy. It was difficult because it was necessary to rebuild everything from scratch, and happy because we at last had our freedom. There was such enthusiasm prevalent that it is impossible to describe it today. At the same time, the struggle against the internal enemy went on. One had to take one's stand then both clearly and distinctly as to which side one supported. Following my brother's example, I joined the Polish Workers' Party and Fighting Youth Union--and not because it was the thing to do back then.

[Question] Such a position required a particular personal courage.

[Answer] Definitely. It was easier for soldiers to fight the enemy at the front than it was to fight the evasive opponent of our system and new power. I personally took a firm stand without any hesitation for the party and the people's new power.

[Question] And when did you begin your professional service, General?

[Answer] In 1950 I became a platoon leader in a mechanized regiment. Shortly afterwards, however, I became permanently involved with quartermaster activities. I gradually advanced to chief of supply and quartermaster of a unit, then of a division, and finally, of the Silesian Military District. I was educated at the Army's General Staff Academy and completed my postgraduate work at the Rear and Transportation Academy in Leningrad. Six years ago, my superiors entrusted me with the position of commandant of the Officers' Institute of Quartermaster Services.

[Question] General, you do not restrict your sociopolitical activity to only the institute, do you?

[Answer] I have carried out various functions in party leadership at various levels; for three terms now, I have been a member of the party committee of the Silesian Military District.

[Question] The officer cadets say that the commandant's door is always wide open. What concerns do they bring to you?

[Answer] Cadre officers settle directly most of the personal matters of the cadets. But then again, there are those problems, as in life itself, which no one can solve except the commandant himself. They come to see me and confide to me their personal affairs. Sometimes they ask for help, sometimes for advice: how best to act in one of life's difficult situations. I believe that they trust me. Recently, a cadet came to me and requested dismissal from the institute. It was not his decision, but his parents'. I think that their role in these important matters is vitally necessary. Beyond this, I prefer that family contacts with the institute and the cadet officers not be immediate. In this case, however, it was a very personal and important decision. It turned out that this cadet had not understood everything, had not realized everything and had not weighed the pros and

cons of the issue carefully enough. My assistance, as well as that of his parents, was indispensable. Meanwhile, another person was waiting outside to see me, an individual who wished to enter the institute. He imagined that he would have no problems with the studies and that he would find a cozy nest here among us. I quickly showed him how wrong he was; I told him that it was not at all easy here, that the standards of the military schools were high, often higher than in civilian schools.

[Question] The institute does not shut itself off from the rest of the world, does it?

[Answer] It has already become a tradition for us to work together with the work forces of Poznan's largest industrial plants: Ciegielski, Moderna and the Provincial Transportation Enterprise. We look after neighboring schools and scout troops. We frequently visit the Owinski School for Blind Children and our cadets and instruction personnel perform many services for the city. I will finally add that every collective success and every distinction won by the institute is my own personal success. And, conversely, behind each of my personal successes are the efforts of my closest colleagues, instruction personnel and officer cadets. It is the same success for all that my name is entered in the "Honor Roll of Soldierly Deeds."

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SCHAFF'S STATEMENTS ON RELIGION DISCUSSED

AU270745 Warsaw NOWE DROGI in Polish May 84 pp 158-161

["About Religion and Religious Policy"--"authorized statement" made by Jaroslaw Ladosz at the national seminar organized by the Higher School of Social Sciences Institute of Philosophy, Sociology, and Religious Knowledge; date and place not given

[Text] In his book "The Communist Movement at a Crossroads," Adam Schaff openly advocates a revision of the Marxist theory of religion. It is true that he resolutely declares that dialectical materialism cannot come to terms with religion because religion believes in spiritualism, that dialectical materialism denotes atheism, and that the communist party is a lay party in politics and atheistic in ideology and should stay as such, but he revises the basic achievements of historical materialism in his analysis of religion, its institutions, and its social character and sources. He revises those achievements by passing over them in silence and by substituting an "axiological" analysis for them. Although his conclusions are directed against enlightened materialism, the methods of his arguments are exclusively materialistic.

As for the sources of religion, Schaff deals only with the cognitive and psychological sources. Religion, he says, does not disappear under the impact of education as proved by many believing scientists, particularly natural scientists. He then "explains" that phenomenon in a truly (or rather quasi) Socratic manner: The more profoundly we study nature, the more profoundly we become aware of our ignorance, of the gaps in our knowledge, and of the unsolved problems, and this why scientists develop a need for God (from the French edition of the aforementioned work, page 150). We said "in a quasi-Socratic manner" because we have really to do with a repetition of the familiar argumentation of the neo-Thomists and with its acceptance. However, there is no explanation why some scientists feel that "need" and some do not. This question is not even posed. At the same time, there is not a word about the sources of religiousness among the masses, especially among the masses in the countries of real socialism!

This is because axiology takes the field. Schaff proclaims that if a believer participates in socialist construction and is in favor of abolishing the

exploitation of man by man, he proves that religion is behind him and inspiring such actions and views. As for nonbelievers, they are motivated and inspired for such actions and views by Marxist philosophy. It is certain, he writes, "that such religious faith may motivate one to accept the economic, social, and political theses of communism, as attested to by the increasingly more numerous participation of believers, primarily Christian believers, in the revolutionary movement even within the communist parties." (The French edition of Schaff's work, page 146) To strengthen his argument Schaff also states that most party members in Poland are believers, even practicing believers.

This argumentation is astonishingly illogical. There is no doubt that believers continue to participate en masse in socialist construction. Nor is there any doubt that they may do it for religious motives. Nor is it a revelation that many practicing believers in our country are party members! Did not Lenin examine long ago the issue of the worker who said: "Socialism is my religion?" He did not question the genuineness of this issue! However, these facts do not show that the believing participants in revolutionary movements participate in them out of religious inspiration. Even the participation of priests or catholic intellectuals in revolutionary movements is not proof that they do so out of religious inspiration. We repeat, this may be so.

If Schaff's ideas are to acquire the true value of proof they must be reinforced by the premise that every believer fighting for socialism and building it does so out of religious inspiration, that every nonbeliever does so out of the inspiration of Marxist philosophy, and that religiousness is an expression of a certain philosophy. However, all of these three premises are actually false, and the first two express pure idealism in the bargain. Schaff's silent recognition of them means that he goes farther than even the most ferocious integrationists. He recognizes their dreams and program as reality! And that Christians are most revolutionary among all kinds of believers (Schaff's examples suggest that these Christians are the Catholics), well, such a claim amounts to primitive politicking. And what about the Muslims, Buddhists, and Hindus? But that is another issue: The "Third World" for Schaff is an insignificant periphery against the background of the world revolutionary process.

However, let us not pooh-pooh Schaff's little theory. His merit lies in that he has made an attempt to formulate or to prop up a wide-ranging tendency to raise the value of religion, except that he has added to the confusion and has ignored the necessary premises. It may be that the champions of that tendency will condemn Schaff for laying cards on the table in such an unwonted manner. Is it not that our media and many official party-state statements have declared the believers and the Marxists to be two sides in politics that negotiate on how to build socialism and that conclude changeable and shaky alliances? Is it not that efforts are being made to turn the believers in the party and--gradually and against resistance--the church into the political spokesmen for everyone? Is it not that the fact that the state and the Church conclude accords is regarded as proof that the Church is getting closer to

socialism and that often this rapprochement is read into the enunciations made by the princes of the Church and their ideologues? The statements that the party recognizes or should recognize the church's moral authority are becoming rife in our country, but they are "cunningly" not expressed to the very end. Is it that we should recognize the fact that the Church is for many believers the primary moral authority (this can be ascertained through a poll), or is it that the Church is such an authority for all believers (that this is not so can also be ascertained through a poll)? Finally, is it that the party should recognize that authority in the name of all party members? Schaff is an intruder and has imparted undesirable clarity to the issue through his theory of the socialist "ecumenism" of believers, nonbelievers, the Church with the pope, and the party.

Recently we have had in Poland a many lay analyses of the doctrinal evolutions in the Catholic Church in our country and in the world and in Catholic ideas. However, there are few works that have attempted to carry out class analyses of those changes. Wherever such analyses are attempted, they are overwhelmed by axiological analyses (often devoid of complete methodological awareness) and by the fact that research is in advance programmed to find out where and to what extent the universal church and its national branches, clergy, and Catholic ideologues change attitudes toward socialism, get used to the idea of socialism, turn aggressiveness to neutrality, and so on. On the basis of that, judgement is passed on the possibilities for, desirability of, and progress in the alliance with "believers." This is a method that is only too doubtful. Such a method can be compared to asserting that the fact that many bourgeois ideologues (as well as bourgeois parties and, at times, bourgeois governments) recognized after the "cold war" period the value of peaceful coexistence among the countries with different social systems is proof that capitalism and socialism have got closer to one another and is reason to proclaim an alliance between socialism and capitalism. It is true that this fact means that an influential segment of the bourgeois has been forced to abandon its hopeless programs for overthrowing real socialism and that promoting such programs amounts to losing "legitimism" among the masses, but it also means that the segment in question continues its struggle on a new plane and is adopting its ideological resources to a new balance of real power in the world.

Let us recall at this point Carrillo's statements on religion. On the surface he revises the Marxist theory in a different way than Schaff when he asserts that religion may become and is now becoming free from alienation. Actually Carrillo says that which Schaff says, but uses a different philosophical phraseology. Schaff does not assert what Carrillo does because for Schaff ignorance will always amount to "alienation," and since it can never be completely eliminated, while the awareness of it gains in strength, and since it produces the need for God now and in the future, then God Himself is a product of alienation. Two, it is impossible to eliminate alienation in socialism because superior values help believers and nonbelievers to alienate themselves from lower values. However, if Schaff would allow a gradation of the intensity of alienation, he would have to acknowledge that this intensity is tending to level off (although it can increase or decrease in absolute

terms) in the case of the believers and nonbelievers who approve of the same values of socialism, because religion is not obstacle to such approval. Actually, Carrillo asserts the same thing.

However, religious beliefs and their institutionalized forms will not cease to constitute "alienation" (in order to be comprehensible for philosophers) even in a classless society--in a far advanced socialism or communism--when they have lost their class roots and when everyone adheres to communist values. This is because even if people under communism resort to God during the process of the implementation of those values, they will do it most obviously because they are not convinced that the forces of the world are able to effect this implementation, because they are not fully conscious of their social activities, and because they continue to see haphazard and formidable elements in social processes. That is why their helplessness vis-a-vis those elements produces the "need" to implore God's help in taming these elements. This is all the more so in our times and in our domestic and external reality, in which class processes are taking place and in which the classes and their interests are behind elemental divergent processes! Believers are not a class of society, and their beliefs (and "motivations" as well as proportions and structures of lay and religious motivations) are merged with the social processes and are differentiated in class terms. The ideologues of religion, religious institutions and their programs, as well as disputes about and evolutions in doctrines express the interests of various classes and class segments.

In general, Communists are for religious tolerance not because they believe in tolerance as such and as an eternal value of mankind and not because they apply it to religion. They are in favor of religious tolerance because alliances with believers are possible and necessary in the course of socialist construction and because believers and nonbelievers equally believe in these alliances, mostly for lay reasons. That is why such alliances are possible and necessary with those few believers who consciously and programmatically link their participation in the struggle for socialism to religious reasons. This approach to the issue has been recognized by Marxism for dozens of years, but this recognition has been rather loose. The point is that if we go deeper it becomes obvious that a struggle is being waged for the very meaning of tolerance and its substance. For example, that which is intolerance for an integrationist, is within the meaning of tolerance for a Catholic progressive. That which is intolerance for the Episcopate is often within the meaning of tolerance for the enlightened segment of the workers class, regardless of whether it believes or not. Class differences, which are often most thoroughly camouflaged, are behind the disputes about the meaning of tolerance. It is important to lay bare the nature of those differences.

The issue of tolerance has to be clarified as regards theology as a pseudo-science, but there is no doubt that tolerance demands that socialism not hinder the pursuit of theology in ecclesiastical seminaries and in theological periodicals. To forbid that would amount to forbidding the contemporary religions to train priests, to forcibly liquidating the historically developed institution of this or that church, and to demanding that the Catholics say

their prayers without priests because this is what we tolerate in full. As is the case in our country, tolerance of theology can be expressed by the state's legal recognition of theological scientific degrees in common with other degrees. However, tolerance does not do away with public criticism of theology as a pseudoscience, although the theologians will regard such criticism as a manifestation of intolerance. Such criticism is not an act against the state or an act of violation of the rule of law, even if the Episcopate demands that it should be. In the same way, public criticism of the scientific nature of Marxism old rule of law. But proclaiming that there exists "Polish socialist theology" is just as absurd as popularizing the term of the "socialist Polonian firm," even if we could apply the former phrase to some Polish "theologian of revolution" who is as yet unborn.

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